

DETERRENCE, DISSUASION, AND AMERICAN POLICY MAKING

by
John Matthew Bryant

A thesis is submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts in Government

Baltimore, Maryland
May 2021

© 2021 John Bryant
All Rights Reserved

Abstract

The international landscape shifts with time. Subsequently, the planning required to meet the needs of contemporary defense and foreign policy objectives changes in stride with the international landscape. As the United States has attempted to keep up with the constantly evolving security needs of the contemporary world, the use and understanding of deterrence has grown beyond the definition: “use-of-threat”. Specifically, deterrence and dissuasion have overlapped in practice and consideration. The overlapping and inappropriate grouping of deterrence and dissuasion in the modern practice of policy creation is problematic, because refraining from properly considering dissuasion as its own tactic jeopardizes American security.

In order to clearly define the line between dissuasion and deterrence, this research utilizes a case study and theory testing methodology. The results of the undertaken methodology have found that dissuasion is a tactic in itself, and possesses its own unique parameters. Dissuasion, based on the case study and theory testing methodology which establish its parameters, is recommended to be appropriately incorporated into policy creation through the institution of Congress. Ultimately, the appropriate incorporation of dissuasion into policy creation will enhance American security by alleviating ills of policy planning scenarios where deterrence is wrongfully used as a remedy.

Primary Reader and Advisor: Dr. Kathryn Wagner Hill

Secondary Readers: Dr. Adam Wolfson, Dr. Collin Paschall

Abstract	ii
1 Introduction	1
2 Chapter One	10
2.1 Dissuasion and Documents of National Security	10
2.2 Dissuasion vs. Deterrence	11
2.3 Assessment of the Undercutting of Dissuasion	14
2.4 Dissuasion and the Future of American National Security	15
2.5 Dissuasion and Iran	19
2.6 Dissuasion and North Korea	21
2.7 Dissuasion and Taiwan	23
2.8 Conclusion	25
3 Chapter Two	31
3.1 Introduction	31
3.2 Literature Review	32
3.2.1 Schools of Thought	32
3.2.2 Deterrence vs. Dissuasion–Wrongful Synonymous Association	33
3.2.3 Suasion Matrix – Theory	36
3.2.4 Conclusion	37
3.3 Methods Section	38
3.4 Presentation and Discussion of Results	40
3.4.1 Iran Nuclear Deal – Exemplar of Dissuasion	40

3.4.2 TRA, Strategic Ambiguity, and American Dissuasion	43
3.4.3 Israel, Nuclear Ambiguity, and American Dissuasion	47
3.5 Conclusion	50
4 Chapter Three	54
4.1 Introduction	54
4.2 Literature Review	56
4.2.1 Schools of Thought	56
4.2.2 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) – Tactic of Dissuasion	58
4.2.3 Conclusion	59
4.3 Presentation and Discussion	61
4.3.1 New Nuclear Deal – What <i>shouldn't</i> it look like?	61
4.3.2 New Nuclear Deal – What <i>should</i> it look like?	63
4.3.3 New Nuclear Deal – Why Iran <i>should</i> agree?	66
4.3.4 New Nuclear Deal – How <i>should</i> it happen?	68
4.3.5 Will a new deal be a tactic of dissuasion?	69
4.4 Conclusion	71
5 Conclusions	76
Bibliography	87

Introduction

United States CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, in a March 2020 hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services testified that: “the United States has leveraged Iran, through deterrence, into a position where their only real option to retaliate is by attacking.”¹ Iranian aggression in modern day comes on the heels of unprecedented deterrence efforts such as economic sanctions implemented by the United States, allocation of American troops to Saudi Arabia, and the assassination of an Iranian General in a targeted drone strike. Subsequently, the inability to confidently predict if Iran will not attack U.S. assets indicates that deterrence methodologies have not achieved the primary objective of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The objective of the NDS is simple. The NDS explains that the enduring mission of the Department of Defense is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States.² Though the United States has implemented deterrence, there is still a possibility that Iran will jeopardize security of the United States by attacking. The realization of a failed deterrence strategy with Iran, due to the continued possibility of Iranian attacks, highlights that there is a “hole” in American policy planning. The author of this thesis served as a staffer on the Senate Committee on Armed Services from 2018 - 2021, and experienced committee deliberations regarding why and where deterrence has failed in policy planning. Based on committee deliberations, the author of this research determined if American

¹ United States Committee on Armed Services.” Hearing | Hearings | United States Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2020.

² National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2018

security is being jeopardized due to failed American deterrence efforts, the time has come to adequately consider dissuasion as a tactic which can be used by or against the United States.

The NDS, in 2018, replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the capstone of strategic guidance to the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The transition from the QDR to the NDS yielded a “hole” in American policy planning which has yet to be filled.

Specifically, the pivot from the QDR to the NDS undercut the consideration of dissuasion as one of four key strategic goals abroad; along with deterring threats as another key strategic goal.³

Subsequently, US policymakers have been left yearning for clarification on how to approach contemporary and future circumstances within the international arena. One example of where US policymakers are contemporarily yearning for clarification on how to approach a dilemma is with the scenario outlined by CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie regarding Iran.

“Some analysts want to downplay dissuasion or set it aside entirely because of its ambiguity. But ignoring this emerging idea would be short sighted.”⁴ Therefore, this research directly addresses dissuasion, and furthers the dialogue around the ambiguous concept. Despite its haziness, the term goes to the heart of new-era geopolitics in several key regions, including the Middle East and Asia, which are discussed in the following chapters. If the United States can understand dissuasion adequately, its strategic effectiveness in troubled regions will improve significantly.⁵

Richard Kuglar, a scholar with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, explained the significance of this research in 2001. When the idea of

³ Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

deterrence first appeared over 50 years ago, it too was ambiguous. During the Cold War, however, it acquired a role of central importance once it was equipped with a full-fledged strategic theory.⁶ This research, in accordance with Kuglar, believes the same may hold true for dissuasion contemporarily - but only if it too is equipped with the full set of analyses and calculations needed to bring it to life.⁷

Through three comprehensive chapters, this research addresses the “hole” which is present in policy planning due to the undercutting of dissuasion as a key strategic goal following the transition from the QDR to the NDS. Chapter one undertakes a blended methodology approach of theory testing and theory proposing. Chapter two utilizes a methodology of classic case study. And, lastly, chapter three brings the first two chapters to a crescendo with a predictive methodology. Through the findings of each chapter, this research will contribute to equipping dissuasion with analysis and calculation needed to bring it to life.

Chapter one fleshes out the history of dissuasion within national security documents, and outlines how the “hole” in contemporary policymaking was formulated when the QDR was replaced with the NDS. Additionally, chapter one contrasts dissuasion with deterrence, and defines the imperative distinction which is apparent when the two are compared side-by-side. Moreover, the first chapter also goes on to explain how dissuasion fits into future policy planning of the United States, and where deterrence does not necessarily meet the needs of the upcoming national security landscape. Chapter one links dissuasion to the three-theatre construct which is likely to be used in future policy planning to keep pace in the new great power competition. The three-theatre construct outlined in the chapter will address Iran, China, and Russia as the

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC

critical adversaries which the U.S. ought to be prepared to compete with by having an adequate understanding of dissuasion.

When considering the three-theatre construct which the United States will likely adopt in preparation to succeed in the new great power competition, chapter one goes on to discuss the types of conflict the U.S. ought to anticipate. The types of conflicts which this research highlights are closely linked to dissuasion and the way in which a deeper understanding of the tactic ties into policy planning. For example, under the anticipated three-theatre construct, there must be a forecast to plan and understand the utilization of strategy and actions to influence the nature of future military competition. “Dissuasion is a subtler concept than deterrence, and pursuing it is less straight forward”⁸. When assessing simultaneous long duration operations and grey zone conflicts, this research offers a way to utilize dissuasion through influencing the strategic psychology and political aspirations of potential adversaries⁹. Influence over the nature of future military conflict and planning which correlates with such scenarios is fleshed out in depth in chapter one. Fleshing out these respective scenarios in this manner is a component of equipping dissuasion with the analysis and calculation needed to bring it to life.

In order to highlight the contemporary relevance of dissuasion in American policy planning, chapter one also delves into the ways and manners in which Iran has wielded dissuasion against the United States. In order to establish with the reader that the contemporary use of dissuasion by Iran against the United States is not a mere anomaly, the chapter also goes on to discuss where Taiwan and North Korea have wielded dissuasion. The objective of chapter one is simple: illuminate where the tactic of dissuasion is present in current policy planning

⁸ Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC

⁹ Ibid

scenarios. As a result, the illumination of where dissuasion is present in current policy planning scenarios solidifies the fact that dissuasion is indeed its own concept, and fits the parameters laid out in this research.

As stated earlier in this introduction, in order to pragmatically construct American policy, policymakers must possess an adequate understanding of dissuasion and the ways in which it has been intertwined with American policy historically. Chapter two, therefore, discusses where the United States itself has used dissuasion as a tactic. The historical examples of American-used dissuasion in chapter two also point out instances where dissuasion has been categorized or classified inappropriately.

To effectively flesh out where and how the United States has utilized dissuasion historically, chapter two leans on a classic method of case study. The classic case study method leans on qualitative information which is explorative, descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory. And, it is important to note that this method refrains from blending statistical and formal approaches. The classic case study methodology used in chapter two creates a compelling foundation to further the differentiation between dissuasion and deterrence, and also sheds a spotlight on where dissuasion has indeed been used by the United States. Particularly, where dissuasion has been used by the United States, but not categorized as such.

It is critical for policy makers and scholars to recognize where dissuasion has been leveraged by the United States itself. The second chapter of this thesis touches on three specific instances of American-used dissuasion. The first instance of American dissuasion is the Iran nuclear deal which was created under the Obama Administration to dissuade Iran. The second example of American dissuasion is the Taiwan Relations Act which is used to dissuade China. The third instance of American-utilized dissuasion is the bolstering of Israel's nuclear ambiguity

to dissuade other nation states from attacking Israel. Each of the historical exemplars of American dissuasion which are highlighted in the second chapter of this research are unique in their own way. However, each of the historical exemplars of chapter two fit within the parameters of dissuasion outlined in chapter one of this thesis. Subsequently, chapter two further equips dissuasion with vital analysis and calculation needed to bring it to life.

Among the key findings in chapter two is that dissuasion is diplomatic in nature, and guides another nation state into acting out of its own volition. Moreover, chapter two goes on to explain how deterrence, on the contrary, uses fear to push another nation state away from a course of action under threat of economic or militaristic terror. These key findings are derived from the definitions of deterrence and dissuasion which are also unpacked in the second chapter. And, in accordance with the respective definitions of dissuasion and deterrence, chapter two doubles down to reinforce that the United States has used dissuasion as an individual tactic through examining historical examples. Inversely, the historical exemplars of American-implemented dissuasion from chapter two do not satisfy the definition of deterrence. Therefore, chapter two further reinforces the differentiation between dissuasion and deterrence, and equips dissuasion with analysis needed to bring it to life.

While the second chapter of this thesis does indeed touch on three different instances of American-utilized dissuasion, one notably significant exemplar is the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) which was established under the Obama Administration. The Iran nuclear deal did not convince Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too great. On the contrary, the Iran Nuclear Deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition. Chapter three takes the dissuasive exemplar of the JCPOA, and uses it as a springboard to predict future use of dissuasion by the United States.

Chapter three explains that the United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran that, according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition oriented around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon.¹⁰ The United States, through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion. Chapter three also explains how the dissuasive JCPOA deal leveraged under the Obama Administration was strikingly different than the approach adopted by the Trump Administration. Specifically, the chapter unpacks how the approach of interacting with Iran which was adopted by the Trump Administration was deterrence-oriented. The JCPOA, under the Obama Administration, was a tactic of dissuasion. And, the JCPOA was crafted and implemented under an administration that consisted of Joe Biden as Vice President. Chapter three delves into the significance of a Biden Administration for the future use of dissuasion.

Chapter three focuses on the new presidential administration with Joe Biden at the helm, and outlines a prediction of a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran. The chapter expresses that there is an anticipation by this research to see the 2015 JCPOA used as a baseline for a new future deal between the United States and Iran. Of course, since the 2015 JCPOA is expected to be used as a baseline, a new nuclear deal which is created under the Biden Administration is expected to be a tactic of dissuasion. Chapter three breaks down the components of what a new nuclear deal is likely to look like, and highlights how the likelihood of a new nuclear deal points to dissuasion being used in American policy in the future.

The third chapter of this research also explains that though there is reason to believe President Joe Biden will pursue another dissuasive deal with Iran, this research expects that President Biden will work to create a deal which parallels that of the 2015 JCPOA, while also

¹⁰ Staff, Washington Post. Full Text: Obama's News Conference on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. WP Company, May 1, 2019

addressing deficiencies and downfalls of the 2015 JCPOA. The chapter articulates predictive expectations of the Biden Administration to address primary deficiencies of the JCPOA. For example, the third chapter will focus on remedies to concerns for congressional support, security of Israel, and support for terrorist organizations should a new deal be pursued. Moreover, chapter three goes into great detail to explain what a new nuclear deal shouldn't look like, what a new deal should look like, why the political landscape is conducive for a new deal, and, of course, how a new nuclear deal will indeed also be a tactic of dissuasion.

The third chapter of this thesis illuminates why it is pragmatic to anticipate any new nuclear deal which the Biden Administration attempts to create with Iran will be dissuasive in nature. The chapter also underscores that should a new nuclear deal as outlined by this research be pursued, the framework laid out by this thesis will be a tool at the disposal of policymakers. The understanding of dissuasion as a tactic and concept in its own right, based on the key points from chapter three, will allow for policymakers to begin planning for the future, and closing the "hole" in American policy planning which was created when the National Defense Strategy replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review. Chapter three finds that dissuasion can be incorporated in American policy planning immediately, and enhance American security by addressing a contemporary policy obstacle. Chapter three proves the relevance of dissuasion in modern day, and equips dissuasion with another analysis needed to bring it to life.

All in all, the chapters which follow this introduction will address the implications of considering dissuasion as its own tactic and concept in terms of policy creation. Dissuasion is a concept which has been severely neglected as the international landscape shifts with time. Now, should policymakers understand and view dissuasion as a tactic and concept in itself, there can be an expectation for the threshold which ought to be met by new initiatives that are undertaken

with the objectives of dissuasion in mind. A new nuclear deal with Iran which parallels the JCPOA, bearing in mind the instances of American dissuasion from chapter two, and the differentiation between dissuasion and deterrence in chapter one, spotlight that understanding dissuasion is indeed a contemporary dilemma.

The research following this introduction will addresses the question of: “so what?”. It is imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion, because an understanding of greater depth between the two concepts will yield stronger American policy, and enhance American security. This research facilitates accomplishing the goal of creating a baseline understanding of how dissuasion is critical to American policy creation, and how an understanding of greater depth will be an invaluable tool to policymakers.

Chapter 1

Dissuasion and Documents of National Security

In 2018, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the capstone of strategic guidance to the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The transition from the QDR to the NDS yielded a “hole” in American defense policy planning which has yet to be filled. Specifically, the pivot from the QDR to the NDS has undercut the consideration of dissuasion as a tactic within international defense policy, and left US policymakers yearning for clarification regarding how to approach contemporary circumstances within the international arena. Dissuasion is a concept which has been severely neglected as the international landscape shifts with age. This paper highlights what exactly dissuasion is in the contemporary sense, and how the concept should be considered as the United States enters the era of the new great power competition.

For context, it is important to understand the previously intended byproduct of implementing the tactic of dissuasion in relation to the United States. According to the 2001 QDR, “dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of US allies”¹¹ was one of the four key goals to guiding development of US forces, capabilities, deployment, and use. So, what exactly was dissuasion according to the 2001 QDR, and how was it expected to accomplish one of the former key goals of the United States?

The 2001 QDR explains that dissuasion is “utilizing strategy and actions, to influence the nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for adversaries. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.”¹² This paper argues that

¹¹ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

¹² *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

dissuasion, based off of the definition provided in the 2001 QDR, is a tactic which can be utilized by any nation state against any other nation state. Notably, dissuasion can be used by a nation state which possesses inferior hard power capabilities against another nation state which possesses superior hard power capabilities. The notion that dissuasion can be used by any nation state against any other nation state (regardless of power dynamic) is critical to the argument of this research. Particularly, the concept of dissuasion being accessible to all nations distinctly separates dissuasion from deterrence.

Dissuasion vs. Deterrence

What exactly makes the tactic of dissuasion different from the tactic of deterrence?

According to the Brookings Institution, “the deterrence concept is straight-forward: persuade a potential adversary that the risks and costs of their proposed actions far outweigh any gains that they might hope to achieve.”¹³ With that said, deterrence is often coupled with hard power capabilities. For example, in relation to the Cold War, “to make deterrence credible, the United States built up powerful strategic, theater and tactical nuclear forces that could threaten any potential aggressor with the catastrophic risks and costs of a nuclear retaliatory strike against their homeland.”¹⁴

Claudia Major and Christian Mölling double down on the definition offered by The Brookings Institution. Major and Mölling explain that there is somewhat of a default deterrence theory which political scientists, policymakers, and military officials reference when discussing foreign policy and the international security environment. Mainly, the default

¹³ Bush, Richard C., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Steven Pifer, and Kenneth M Pollack. “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges.” Brookings. Brookings, July 28, 2016.

¹⁴ Ibid

understanding of deterrence theory echoes back to the Cold War and simple militaristic superiority. The traditional default Cold War interpretation of deterrence is not adequate for modern day. Major and Mölling claim that a “much broader conceptual work on deterrence is needed. How can deterrence work in a world in which security is much more than a military matter?.”¹⁵

Though Major and Mölling reinforce the definition of deterrence offered by the Brookings Institution, the two scholars also claim that “in fact, deterrence can work in a world in which security is more than a military matter. However, this is only true if the psychological-cognitive dimension of deterrence is understood, and effectively utilized.”¹⁶ This paper, on the contrary, argues that the effective utilization of the psychological-cognitive dimension of deterrence is not truly deterrence. Rather, the respective psychologically-driven tactic which Major and Mölling are referring to is dissuasion. This paper also believes that the psychologically-driven tactic which Major and Mölling present, aligns with the definition of dissuasion outlined in the 2001 QDR.

So, why is dissuasion different than deterrence with respect to hard power capacities? “The trick remains as ever to convince one’s adversary that it is futile to try to use force in the pursuit of their interests, even if it is no longer (mainly) about tanks and nukes.”¹⁷ The ultimate objective between deterrence and dissuasion may be similar, but the tactics to implementing either of the two is the difference. The difference in tactical implementation between deterrence and dissuasion is part of what is considered a gap of knowledge for conflict theory. The gap of knowledge between tactical implementation of deterrence and dissuasion comprises part of the

¹⁵ Major, Claudia, and Christian Mölling. “Rethinking Deterrence: Adapting an Old Concept to New Challenges” Report. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2016.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

“hole” in American defense policy planning which policymakers are grappling with.

As previously stated, dissuasion is “utilizing strategy and actions, to influence the nature of future military competitions, channeling threats in certain directions, and complicating military planning for adversaries. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.”¹⁸ Deterrence, on the other hand, is “persuading a potential adversary that the risks and costs of their proposed actions far outweigh any gains that they might hope to achieve”¹⁹, and is often reinforced with the threat of hard power consequences. Subsequently, based off of the definition of dissuasion derived from the 2001 QDR and the definition of deterrence from The Brookings Institution, dissuasion can be utilized by inferior hard power capable states against another nation state which possesses superior hard power capabilities.

It is important to recognize that dissuasion is not limited to being used solely by nation states which possess inferior hard power capabilities when going toe-to-toe with a nation state possessing superior hard power capabilities. Dissuasion, since the tactic is merely utilizing strategy and actions to channel threats in certain directions, can also be used by more-capable nations against less-capable countries. However, the same cannot be said for deterrence. Deterrence is a tactic which can only be leveraged by a militarily and economically superior country against a militarily and economically inferior country. So, while dissuasion is the only defense tactic available for a militarily and economically inferior country, dissuasion and deterrence are not mutually exclusive for a nation with superior hard power capabilities.

¹⁸ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

¹⁹ Bush, Richard C., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Steven Pifer, and Kenneth M Pollack. “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges.” Brookings. Brookings, July 28, 2016.

Assessment of the Undercutting of Dissuasion

The question must be posed: where has dissuasion been undercut as was claimed in the beginning of this paper? In order to find evidence of the proposition that the tactic of dissuasion has been undercut in defense planning, there can be citation of the National Defense Strategy. The NDS of the United States highlights that one of the primary defense objectives of the US Department of Defense (DoD) is “dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and non-state actors.”²⁰ Throughout the entire NDS document summary, dissuasion is only mentioned once. Specifically, dissuasion is mentioned in the exact quote from the NDS which is presented in this paragraph. Moreover, dissuasion is coupled with deterrence in the NDS summary, and is not considered with respect to the way it can be wielded by adversarial nation states which possess inferior hard power capabilities.

“In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld introduced the concept of dissuasion, citing it as one of the ‘four key goals that will guide the development of US forces and capabilities, their deployment and use’”²¹. In the current NDS, dissuasion is mentioned almost in a passing sense through one of the primary defense objectives. The lack of consideration for the use of dissuasion by adversarial nation states which possess inferior hard power capabilities comprises the “hole” in American defense policy planning which leaves US policymakers yearning for clarification on how to approach contemporary circumstances within the international arena. Not to mention, pivoting away from considering dissuasion with respect to American defense policy is diminishing

²⁰ National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2018

²¹ Krepinevich, Andrew F, and Robert Martinage. “Dissuasion Strategy.” CSBA. Accessed May 8, 2021. <https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/dissuasion-strategy/publication/1>.

American defense prospects for success in the newly emerging great power competition.

The NDS explains that the enduring mission of the Department of Defense is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States. Should deterrence fail, the Joint force is prepared to reinforce America's traditional tools of diplomacy, through military options which ensure the President and U.S. diplomats negotiate from a position of strength²². Be that as it may, the contemporary landscape of preserving national security yields an uncertainty regarding the successful implementation of "deterrence strategy" against adversarial nations which possess a distinctly less-significant hard power capability in comparison to the United States. The uncertainty ("hole" in American defense policy) is a byproduct of the evolution of international relations and hard power capabilities across the globe. Accounting for dissuasion from adversarial states is not given adequate consideration. Dissuasion is a concept which possesses a framework of its own, and should garner a higher level of scrutiny which was lost from the transition of the QDR to the NDS.

Dissuasion and the Future of American National Security

How does dissuasion fit into future defense policy initiatives of the United States, and where does deterrence not meet the needs of the upcoming defense landscape? According to Dr. Robert Haffa of Johns Hopkins University, it is likely the United States will pursue a three-theatre construct when planning for future conflicts. In fact, the Trump Administration indicated it was likely already implementing a three-theatre construct to keep pace with the new great power competition. The three-theatre strategy will likely focus on Russia, China, and Iran

²² National Defense Strategy of the United States, 2018

as the critical adversarial nation states which the U.S. military is sized and shaped to meet. Though the greatest focus moving forward ought to primarily be allocated toward Russia and China as the adversaries which pose the most prominent threats, a unique situation arises when assessing Iran.

Previously, the United States has undertaken a strategy which anticipates one or two major conflicts which the US military will be involved with. However, with the changing of the landscape within the great power competition, there is not likely to be one or two major wars which the United States should be prepared to endure. Rather, there ought to be consideration of simultaneous long duration operations. The moving parts which facilitate simultaneous long duration operations play to the advantage of Iran and its implementation of dissuasion. The simultaneous long duration operations which the United States must be prepared to endure allow the Iranian regime to utilize strategy and actions to influence the nature of future military competition with the United States. Iran has been able to leverage the landscape of the new great power competition to channel threats in certain directions, and complicate American military planning. Through channeling threats in certain direction and complicating military planning, Iran has utilized the tactic of dissuasion.

In the following section of this paper, the ways and manners in which Iran has wielded dissuasion will be highlighted to exemplify a contemporary instance of where the United States is inadequately addressing the policy planning surrounding the tactic of dissuasion. Subsequently, there will be additional sections of this paper which highlight examples of where Taiwan and North Korea have also wielded dissuasion. Ultimately, it is the objective of this chapter to illuminate where the tactic of dissuasion is present in current policy planning scenarios.

Considering that deterrence has not been successful on behalf of the United States

against Iran, it can be inferred that Iran has successfully implemented and utilized dissuasion. The Iranian regime has taken actions within the years of 2019 and 2020, which under rational thought, could garner a much more serious militaristic response from the United States than what has already been utilized. With that said, the United States has remained extremely calculated and measured in the use of military-oriented hard power.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has dissuaded the United States from acting more aggressively. And, in a way, the Iranian regime is winning the contentious relationship with the United States. At worst, Iran has leveraged the US into a corner where any further escalation is not likely or extremely incremental. The result is that Iran has determined the American threshold of utilizing hard power capabilities and used that determination to successfully wield the tactic of dissuasion.

Despite the claims by General McKenzie, Iran has proven that they are not fearful of attacking the United States. Cognizant of its technological and military inferiority vis-à-vis adversaries such as the United States, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Iran chooses to employ this range of tools to subvert and provoke its adversaries and test the threshold for tolerance of its activities, while ensuring that it operates short of large-scale warfare.²³ Specifically, decades of economic sanctions have forced Iran to exercise resourcefulness and creativity, using methods that are unconventional to counter conventionally superior adversaries.²⁴ It can be anticipated that as long as Iran lacks the conventional military power to match the United States or Israel, the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

²³ McInnis, J. Matthew, Jon B. Alterman, Michael Connell, Michael Eisenstadt, Farideh Farhi, Thomas Karako, Hijab Shah, Michael Sulmeyer, and Ian Williams. *Deterring Iran after the Nuclear Deal*. Report. Edited by Hicks Kathleen H. and Dalton Melissa G. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. 25-33.

²⁴ Ibid

(IRGC) will look to sustain and build proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi'ite militias in Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen to pressure the United States, its allies, and regional partners to balance the deterrence equation.²⁵

Moreover, Iran overtly launched a missile attack on a US base as recently as January of 2020. According to The Brookings Institution, Iranian leadership proclaimed the attack as a “slap in the face” to the United States.²⁶ There is also concern of Iran launching more overt attacks against the US. According to Daniel Byman, the most obvious probability of more attacks will be on another U.S. base or other official facility in Iraq due to the extensive networks and proxies highlighted in the previous paragraph.²⁷ The concern of recent and potentially new attacks clashes with the outline of successful deterrence proposed by Mölling, General McKenzie, and the Brookings Institution.

The actions of Iran are not consistent with Mölling's explanation of deterrence, General McKenzie's explanation of achieving deterrence, or the definition of deterrence presented by The Brookings Institution. Iran has managed to continuously attack American allies and Americans without an overwhelming American military retaliation which could easily win a militaristic engagement between the two nations. Additionally, as is stated previously, the same components of the new landscape of the great power competition which allow Iran to use dissuasion are also present with Taiwan and North Korea.

Dissuasion and Iran

²⁵ McInnis, J. Matthew, Jon B. Alterman, Michael Connell, Michael Eisenstadt, Farideh Farhi, Thomas Karako, Hijab Shah, Michael Sulmeyer, and Ian Williams. *Deterring Iran after the Nuclear Deal*. Report. Edited by Hicks Kathleen H. and Dalton Melissa G. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. 25-33.

²⁶ Byman, Daniel L. “Iran's next Move.” Brookings. Brookings, January 10, 2020.

²⁷ Ibid

In accordance with the argument of this research, the methodologies leveraged by Iran fall starkly in line with the definition of dissuasion outlined by the 2001 QDR. In elaboration, the increasingly tense relationship between the United States and Iran has unearthed the issue that deterrence strategy against Iran, though claimed successful by military leadership, has not entirely deterred undesired aggressive actions by the Iranian regime. Particularly, it is difficult to predict and confidently answer if Iran will attack United States troops or allies in the region despite serious deterrence efforts by the US.

For example, in a March hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, United States CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie testified that: “the United States has leveraged Iran into a position where their only real option to retaliate is by attacking.”²⁸ Iranian aggression in modern day comes on the heels of unprecedented economic sanctions implemented by the United States, allocation of American troops to Saudi Arabia, and the assassination of an Iranian General in a targeted drone strike. Subsequently, the inability to confidently predict that Iran will not attack the U.S. indicates that traditional deterrence methodologies have not achieved the objective of the NDS. As highlighted in the introduction to this paper, American National Security documents focus primarily on the actions of larger more capable nation states. However, strategic actions taken by Iran have kept the United States from moving forward in an even more aggressive militaristic manner.

This research finds that Iran has successfully implemented the tactic of dissuasion against the United States. With that said, as additional evidence that there is a “hole” in American defense policy planning, it can be argued that Iran fulfilled the objective of

²⁸ “United States Committee on Armed Services.” Hearing | Hearings | United States Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2020. <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/20-03-12-united-states-central-command>.

deterrence outlined in the Department of Defense's (DoD) 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM). The Department of Defense's (DoD) 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review defines deterrence operations as "integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over adversaries' decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war."²⁹

Deterrence in the contemporary sense possesses far too broad of a meaning. The broad use of the term "deterrence" in the NDS (and now the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review) outlines a legacy of misinterpreting deterrence tactics and undercutting dissuasion. "Without mentioning whom or what is being deterred, the word can refer to either nuclear deterrence or conventional deterrence, and to either retaliatory or first strike attacks."³⁰ Or, with respect to this paper, deterrence operations (based on the quote from QRM) can also be interpreted as dissuasion.

This research argues that the tactic of dissuasion which has been used by Iran has also been used in contemporary instances. For example, Taiwan has successfully dissuaded China from taking more drastic military measures in the midst of the contentious relationship between the two states. And, North Korea, on the "brink of war" with the United States following the election of President Donald Trump, kept the US from retaliating in a severely militaristic manner. The common denominator between each of the offered historic examples is one militarily and economically superior nation engaging in a contentious relationship with a militarily and economically inferior nation. The byproduct is that of dissuasion being wielded by the inferior state.

Dissuasion and North Korea

²⁹ Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2009.

³⁰ Kristensen, Hans M., Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. Report. Federation of American Scientists, 2009. 14-20.

Similarly to Iran, North Korea has leveraged the tactic of dissuasion against the United States. “The U.S. has frequently used unilateral sanctions against many countries as a regular tenet of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.”³¹ In fact, roughly “75 percent of the world's nearly 200 countries were subject to U.S. sanctions as of 2000.”³² The United States followed the hard power tactic of sanctioning through implementation against the North Korean regime. US sanctions against North Korea have entailed tremendous economic costs to the regime, but they have mostly failed to change the behavior of North Korean leadership.³³ The failed hard power tactic of sanctions continued to fail into the Presidency of Donald J. Trump. And, outside of economic sanctions, militaristically-oriented hard power tactics failed into the Trump presidency as well.

In regards to militaristically-oriented hard power, the United States has implemented tactics which far outnumber the examples which are outlined in this paper. However, under the Trump Administration, militar-oriented hard power tactics which have been utilized include (but are not limited to) flying US B1-B strategic bombers near North Korea’s coast, the farthest north they have flown in the 21st century³⁴ in September of 2017, a joint United States and South Korean military exercise (19-2 Dong Maeng) in August of 2019³⁵, and the sustainment of American troops along the demilitarized zone of the Korean Peninsula.

What was the ultimate goal of casting economic sanctions and military tactics under the umbrella of hard power toward North Korea? The objective of the United States against North

³¹ Kim, Suk Hi, and Mario Martin-Hermosillo. "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear NorthKorea." *North Korean Review* 9, no. 2 (2013): 99-110.

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

³⁴ “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association. Accessed May 8, 2020. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

³⁵ “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association. Accessed May 8, 2020. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

Korea was to denuclearize North Korea and dampen militaristic aggressiveness of the DPRK. In other words, the United States aimed to deter North Korea from continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and cease conducting provocative military operations. Similarly to economic sanctions, military deterrence mostly failed to change the behavior of North Korean leadership.

The contemporary actions of North Korea have shown little success of American deterrence. As recently as March first of 2020, North Korea launched two short-range projectiles, believed to be the KN-25³⁶. On March 9th, North Korea conducted a test launch of three projectiles as part of joint strike drills that included multiple types of rocket launchers³⁷. On March 30th, the DPRK launched two short-range ballistic missiles, believed to be the KN-25, marking its fourth missile test of the year at that point.³⁸ And, on April 14th, North Korea tested a series of short-range missiles which marked North Korea's first launch of a cruise missile in nearly three years.³⁹ North Korea has shown minimal desire to adhere to American desires, and pressed forward despite American deterrence efforts.

The United States, in relation to North Korea, is the far superior nation when it comes to hard power capabilities. However, somehow, the North Korean leadership has steered strategy and actions in a manner which has influenced the nature of the military competition. North Korea has used dissuasion to guide the United States into avoiding more drastic military action.

Dissuasion and Taiwan

Just as Iran and North Korea have wielded the tactic of dissuasion against the United

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ibid

States, another instance of dissuasion which this paper argues is utilized by Taiwan against China. It is important to note that there is a different dynamic of relations between Taiwan and China when compared to the relationship between the United States and North Korea. Specifically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) views the island (Taiwan) as a province, while in Taiwan - a territory with its own democratically elected government that is home to twenty-three million people - political leaders have differing views on the island's status and relations with the mainland.⁴⁰ Taiwan has taken steps to defy the notion of being a province of mainland China. Political frictions shadow the relationship, and China and Taiwan have experienced a renewal in tensions under new leadership.⁴¹ Nonetheless, dissuasion, through steering strategy and actions in a manner which influence the nature of military competition, has been wielded by Taiwanese leadership.

China, as part of its continued military expansion, has deployed missiles along the Taiwan Strait and periodically conducted drills near the island of Taiwan. China has also gone as far as sending bombers, fighter jets, and an aircraft carrier over and around the strait as shows of force.⁴² The objective of flexing militaristic hard power capabilities on behalf of China has been to accomplish the definition of deterrence outlined by The Brookings Institution. Ultimately, China has attempted to convince Taiwan that the risks and costs of considering formal diplomatic relations with other major powers and international organizations (essential if Taiwan is to survive separately from the Communist mainland)⁴³ far outweigh any gains that they might hope to achieve. Despite hard power deterrence efforts by

⁴⁰ Albert, E. (n.d.). China-Taiwan Relations. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations>

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Albert, E. (n.d.). China-Taiwan Relations. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations>

China, Taiwan has continued to take steps which lean toward independence from mainland China.

In January of 2019, Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, rejected the 1992 Consensus.⁴⁴ For context, the 1992 Consensus outlines that there is only “one China” but allows for differing interpretations, by which both Beijing and Taipei agree that Taiwan belongs to China. The tacit agreement underlying the 1992 Consensus is that Taiwan will not seek independence.⁴⁵ Moreover, Taiwan has fostered a relationship with the United States in relation to arms sales which is in direct opposition of Chinese desires. In fact, between 2007 and 2018, US Arms Sales to Taiwan have totaled over \$25 billion.⁴⁶

The Trump administration also seemed to be deepening ties with Taiwan over Chinese objections, proposing multiple arms deals and unveiling a new \$250 million complex for its de facto embassy in Taipei.⁴⁷ So, this paper must consider the ramifications and intentions of these actions from the standpoint of the Taiwanese. This paper proposes that Taiwan is leveraging a relationship with the United States to influence the nature of military competition with China. Factors such as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which allows for arms sales to Taiwan for self-defense and does not rule out the possibility of the United States defending Taiwan from Chinese attack, is a policy known as strategic ambiguity.⁴⁸ Strategic ambiguity is a layer within dissuasion which aims to steer the nature of military competition with mainland China.

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid

⁴⁸ Albert, E. (n.d.). China-Taiwan Relations. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations>

In full, China has used distinct militarily-oriented hard power capabilities as an effort to deter Taiwan. It is undoubtedly true that China is the superior hard power capable nation in comparison to Taiwan. With that said, factors such as the Taiwan Relations Act, entertaining arms deals with the Trump administration, and unveiling a new \$250 million complex for its de facto embassy in Taipei are complicating the effectiveness of hard power deterrence efforts of China. Strategic ambiguity has provided a path for Taiwan to continue with undesired actions by China. Therefore, Taiwan is wielding dissuasion.

Conclusion

Given the challenges faced and shortcomings revealed during strategy formulation experiences, there is a chorus of outside experts and commentators who argue that the strategy formulation process is broken.⁴⁹ Dissuasion, according to this paper, is one of the factors which are contributing to contemporary strategy formulation challenges. According to CSIS, Barry Watts and Andrew Krepinevich, complain that, “the ability of the U.S. national security establishment to craft, implement, and adapt effective long-term strategies against intelligent adversaries at acceptable costs has been declining for some decades.”⁵⁰ Refraining from incorporating and considering dissuasion as a tactic which is wielded by lesser nation states falls into the declining ability to craft, implement, and adapt effective long-term strategies against intelligent adversaries.

Frank Hoffman notes half a dozen authors who criticize the processes and results and complains that “too often the edges of risk, assumptions, and alternatives are sanded off at

⁴⁹ Cancian, Mark F., Rick McPeak, Melissa Dalton, John Schaus, Colin McElhinny, Andrew Metrick, Hijab Shah, William Arnest, Stephanie Hartley, Alexa Hopkins, and Aftan Snyder. *Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices*. Report. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. 10-24.

⁵⁰ Ibid

lower levels”.⁵¹ According to CSIS and Frank Hoffman, the criticisms note a wide range of failings: lack of clear priorities, “lowest common denominator” recommendations resulting from development by consensus, lack of candor driven by fear of alienating some interest group, weak connections between strategy and resources, slowness in responding to changes in the national security environment, and a high staff burden.⁵² Should the United States incorporate dissuasion in national security documents to plan for intelligent but less-capable adversaries leveraging the tactic, this research finds that ailments associated with clarity of priorities will be alleviated.

Comprehensively, this paper has highlighted how dissuasion is leveraged as a tactic within the international community. Examples of contemporary relationships have been used to reinforce the finding of a contemporary need to fill the present gap in national security strategizing. The arguments of this research ought to be contemplated as a component toward a path forward for US policymakers and the defense community at large in the pursuit of overcoming challenges faced and shortcomings experienced in national security strategy formulation.

This research finds that there must be propositions of substance which provide a path toward remedying the ailments of current shortcomings in American national security planning. With that said, propositions must also balance strategy and resources as is explained by CSIS and Frank Hoffman. This research proposes revising documents of national security to adequately address the tactic of dissuasion. First and foremost, the National Defense Strategy ought to

⁵¹ Cancian, Mark F., Rick McPeak, Melissa Dalton, John Schaus, Colin McElhinny, Andrew Metrick, Hijab Shah, William Arnest, Stephanie Hartley, Alexa Hopkins, and Aftan Snyder. *Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices*. Report. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. 10-24.

⁵² Ibid

include a more comprehensive consideration of dissuasion being used by less-capable nation states against the United States. As was specified in the early portions of this paper, the NDS is lacking in addressing dissuasion. Specifically, the NDS should “spotlight” Iran and explain exactly how the rouge nation state is wielding dissuasion. Simply, the National Defense Strategy can reference the same credible sources which comprise the arguments of this paper.

A more prudent crafting of the National Defense Strategy in the future may include acknowledging The Brookings Institution description of potentially foreseeable future attacks being conducted by Iran against U.S. installations in Iraq. It may also be prudent for the NDS to reiterate, in the same section which “spotlights” Iran, that anticipated future attacks outlined by The Brookings Institution align with the definition of dissuasion offered by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Specifically, there ought to be language which emphasizes that Iran is utilizing strategy and actions, influencing the nature of future military competitions, channeling threats in certain directions, and therefore complicating military planning for The United States.⁵³

The proper recognition and acknowledgment of dissuasion being used by Iran as an explicit tactic in the NDS will allow policymakers to frame their congressional testimonial questioning accordingly. Should the NDS provide a credible platform which explains dissuasion and how it is indeed a contemporary issue, there will be a foundation which elected members of Congress can use as a guide to ask more targeted questions in open and closed hearings regarding the status-quo of American defense policy planning. Ideally, members of congress will ask how the U.S. intends to move forward with shaping future strategies to meet the needs of emerging and present threats which are contingent on the ability of states like Iran leveraging the tactic of dissuasion. This will be fleshed out in detail in the conclusion of

⁵³ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

this thesis.

Having the NDS as a credible platform to reinforce targeted questioning in the midst of open and closed testimony will allow defense committees of Congress to incorporate answers of the respective questions into the annual formulation of the National Defense Authorization Act. The incorporation of hearing testimony derived from the newly reinforced foundation of the NDS will yield what this paper believes will be immediate results in combatting dissuasion being exploited against the United States. Essentially, the simple incorporation of what dissuasion is, and where it is a contemporary issue, in the NDS, will give policymakers an opportunity to refine strategies for the future through targeted questioning in open and closed hearings.

This research also finds that there is a need for a remedy related to dissuasion which will fall under the Executive Branch of the United States. Again, in relation to the formulation of national security documents, the second proposition this paper offers is combatting dissuasion through the President of the United States acknowledging and recognizing dissuasion as a tactic by less-capable states in the National Security Strategy (NSS). If the President may properly acknowledge and recognize the obstacles which dissuasion is contemporarily presenting, the NDS and NSS can both be used as a foundation for testimonial questioning by elected members of Congress. Particularly, the NSS will also allow members of Congress to ask targeted questions for future dissuasion-oriented obstacles outside of Iran.

Dissuasion-focused content of the Nation Security Strategy may be done in a regional context. The proposition of this research for the Executive Branch is ideal considering that the most recent NSS possesses a section which explicitly focuses on *Strategy in a Regional Context*. The current NSS section of Strategy in a Regional Context spotlights the Indo-

Pacific, Europe, Middle East, South and Central Asia, Western Hemisphere, and Africa.⁵⁴ As is highlighted previously, several contemporary instances of dissuasion being used internationally fall in several regional locations. For example, dissuasion is being used by Iran in the Middle East, Taiwan is using dissuasion against China in Southeast Asia, and North Korea is also using dissuasion against the United States in East Asia. Should the NSS provide an additional platform for members of Congress to ask targeted questions regarding dissuasion-oriented scenarios outside of the Middle East (Iran), this paper anticipates that policymakers will be able to play a greater role in addressing dissuasion throughout the globe.

Dissuasion, based off of the arguments of this research, is indeed a real and present threat to defense planning of the United States. That being said, it is advised in this paper to also consider dissuasion as a potentially emerging threat in future scenarios of national security formulation. Dr. Robert Haffa at Johns Hopkins University claims that the full landscape of the emerging new great power competition is yet to be established. As international power potentially shifts according to the development of international affairs, this paper believes it is not out of the realm of possibility that dissuasion may be wielded by other less-capable nation states which are unseen at this current moment and unrecognized in this paper.

Properly addressing the tactic of dissuasion in documents of national security such as the NDS and the NSS will allow members of Congress to ask targeted testimonial questions which meet the needs of present and future instances of dissuasion. The ultimate objective, in present day, ought to be providing an avenue for lawmakers to start incorporating useful feedback from testimony into the National Defense Authorization Act. The incorporation of testimonial answers related to dissuasion will facilitate the passing of legislation focused on

⁵⁴ President of the United States. *The national security strategy of the United States of America*.2017.

dissuasion-related issues. Subsequently, there can be an expectation of beginning to close this particular hole in defense policy planning.

Chapter 2

Introduction

Dissuasion, according to the first chapter of this thesis, is a tactic which has been wielded against the United States. The preceding chapter of this thesis also explains that

dissuasion is inherently different than deterrence because dissuasion can be used by any and all nation states. The attribute of being at the disposal of any country is notable. Particularly, when compared to dissuasion, deterrence can only be wielded by nations which possesses hard power capabilities such as economic or militaristic superiority. Of course, the concept of hard power only being accessible to countries with economic or militaristic superiority is also explained in the preceding chapter of this thesis.

In order to pragmatically construct American policy, policymakers must possess an adequate understanding of dissuasion and the ways in which it has been intertwined with American policy historically. Particularly, it is critical for policy makers and scholars to recognize where dissuasion has been leveraged by the United States itself. The preceding chapter addressed the differences between dissuasion and deterrence. Chapter two, subsequently, is allocated toward fleshing out how the United States itself has used dissuasion, but not classified or categorized dissuasion appropriately.

Dissecting three historical instances of American-implemented dissuasive tactics is the most manageable way to highlight how dissuasion has been utilized in American policy. This paper will highlight where dissuasion has clearly been utilized in American policy, but not been labeled or categorized as such. The three instances this research will address are the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and bolstering nuclear ambiguity for Israel at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War. As a baseline derived from chapter one of this thesis, dissuasion will be acknowledged as “utilizing strategy and actions, to influence the nature of future military competitions, channeling threats in certain directions, and complicating

military planning for adversaries.”⁵⁵ Additionally, this chapter will discuss how dissuasion possesses diplomacy as an attribute, and how the lack of explicit threats (hard power) differentiates dissuasion from deterrence. Comprehensively, this paper will discuss targeted American strategy and policy examples which illuminate how the United States has leveraged dissuasion in American policy historically.

Literature Review

Schools of Thought:

“The dictionary tells us that power means an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not do.”⁵⁶ Joseph Nye, in regards to international relations, expounds upon the definition of power through articulating that the definition does not have one narrow everlasting meaning. Rather, the understanding of power in international relations is somewhat fluid. Specifically, the dynamic of power in international relations is a byproduct of a consistently changing international landscape. Therefore, if not periodically revised to keep pace with an ever-changing international landscape, the concept of power begins to yield gaps in knowledge.

Nye explains that the definition of power is losing emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. Specifically, “factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important”.⁵⁷ Though the dynamic of power in international relations shifts as factors fluctuate in significance, there are still two fundamental

⁵⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

⁵⁶ Nye, Joseph S. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-71.

⁵⁷ Nye, Joseph S. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-71.

camps of defining power: hard power and soft power.

Contemporarily, the “fragmentation of world politics into many different spheres has made power resources less fungible, that is, less transferrable from sphere to sphere”.⁵⁸ Nye explains that the direct use of force, for economic gain in the sense, is generally too costly and dangerous for modern great nation states to risk.⁵⁹ Therefore, alternative tactics must be pursued by prominent nation states on the international stage to accomplish respective objectives and needs.

The point of fungibility outlined by Nye is a threshold which determines the use of hardpower or soft power. If the direct use of force (hard power) is too costly and dangerous to risk, soft power must be pursued. It is critical to fill the gaps in knowledge which appear as the international landscape shifts relating to the two camps of hard and soft power. Currently, the tactic of dissuasion falls under the umbrella of soft power. Deterrence, on the other hand, falls under the umbrella of explicit hard power. Despite dissuasion and deterrence possessing distinctly different characteristics which align them with the categories of hard and soft power, dissuasion and deterrence are typically lumped into the same generic category inappropriately.

Deterrence vs. Dissuasion – Wrongful Synonymous Association:

Most literature surrounding international security gives relatively short and unfulfilling explanations from where the term “deterrence” is derived.⁶⁰ Additionally, the term “deterrence” is used synonymously with the term “dissuasion” by the French with regards to international

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

relations.⁷ The 2001 QDR, however, “employed the term in broader ways that reflect its usage in the English language”⁶¹. It is understandable how the two tactics are frequently paired as one in the same. However, within the context of the current international landscape, deterrence and dissuasion fulfill different policy functions and attributes as they did under the key strategic goals laid out by Donald Rumsfeld.

“The word ‘de-terrence’ in English consists of two parts that go back to (at least) ancient Latin. The ‘de’-prefix in ‘de’-terrence – similarly to so many other common verbs like deflect, depart, detach, derail, deviate, defend etc. – connotes ‘away from’.”⁶² Moreover, “The ‘-terrence’ part will for most people (accurately) trigger associations with the word ‘terror’, which derives from the Latin verb *terrere* ‘fill with fear, frighten’.”⁶³ According to Yar Batoh, “those two components – 1) to use ‘fear’ to 2) push somebody ‘away from’ a course of action they may want to pursue – do indeed appear to be two foundational definitional building blocks that we find back in all disciplines in which deterrence is a focus of theoretical and/or practical inquiry”.⁶⁴

Keeping the roots of the term “deterrence” in mind, dissuasion in international relations takes a different form. “The ability to sway a third party – can take two basic forms. One form entails the ability to make somebody not pursue an intended course of action. This is what the Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Schelling called deterrence.”⁶⁵ By definition, deterrence-motivated

⁶¹ Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept”. DTIC

⁶² David Yost, “Debating Security Strategies,” *Nato Review*, accessed October 6, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art4.html>

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. *Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design*. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

refrainment from a desired action is rooted in an underlying or overt threat should the action be pursued. Dissuasion, as a separate tactic, refers to guiding somebody to do something out of their own volition.⁶⁶ Volition, would be acting out of will. The decision of taking a specific course of action out of will of is a critical distinction when compared to taking a specific course of action out of fear of an implied threat.

Glen Snyder defined deterrence by denial as “the capability to deny the other party any gains from the move which is to be deterred”.⁶⁷ Davis elucidates that Snyder was explaining a distinction from the commonplace interpretation of deterrence. This is problematic because “extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates distinctions on which critical reasoning and effective communication depend”.⁶⁸ Therefore, in order to reduce obfuscation and wrongful synonymous association, dissuasion must be considered as its own respective tactic; not simply another form of deterrence (deterrence by denial). Comprehensively, dissuasion falls under the umbrella of soft power and deterrence falls under the umbrella of hard power. There is a clear distinction between the tactics of deterrence and dissuasion. Therefore, there ought to be a scholarly line which is clarified and established to avoid misclassification. Batoh has attempted to explain this distinction between the two tactics in a theory of suasion matrix.

Suasion Matrix - Theory:

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Paul Davis, “Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial: Using Simple Cognitive Models of the Adversary to Inform Strategy” (Rand Corporation, January 2014).

⁶⁸ Ibid

Dissuasion, as articulated by Batoh, “refers not to *what* is to be achieved but to *how* – the means that are employed to get there”.⁶⁹ Therefore, according to Batoh, there must be two conceivable options with this distinction. Simply, one of those options involves positive incentives (carrots), the other relies on disincentives (sticks).⁷⁰ Batoh provides a matrix which sets parameters for this theory which he refers to as *Suasion Matrix - Theory*.

“These two dimensions – what do we want to achieve and how can we achieve it – lead to a 2-by-2 matrix with four different cells, all of which can be populated with a number of concrete capability, policy, concepts and or ecosystem options.”⁷¹ According to Batoh, “the top left cell is about making one’s own preferred course of action (COA) of another nation state also preferable to that respective state (seduction, coaxing, etc.). The bottom left is about making all options other than one’s own desired COA to be unpalatable to another nation state (intimidation, bullying, etc.)”.⁷² Leftover are the cells in the top and bottom right corners. “The bottom right cell is about making one’s own undesired COA by another nation state unpalatable to that state (threaten, discourage, etc.). The top right cell is about making some alternative, less undesirable COAs of another nation state more attractive to that respective state (bribery, side-payments, etc.)”.¹⁹ Moreover, Batoh explains that “the top left and bottom right are about changing the target’s perception about one COA”.⁷³

The Suasion Matrix, according to Batoh, encountered obstacles of its own. “In the multiple sessions where experimentation was conducted with this matrix, there was difficulty

⁶⁹ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Ibid

labeling the cells.”⁷⁴ Difficulty labeling the cells is a byproduct and indication of the gap in knowledge which currently exists due to muddled lines between the tactics of dissuasion and deterrence. The matrix provided by Batoh solely focuses on dissuasion and persuasion; both of which utilize “carrots” and “sticks” as incentives.

Conclusion:

The Suasion Matrix provided by Batoh will make more sense if dissuasion is viewed as “carrots”, and deterrence is viewed as “sticks”; both of which can promote or repel COA’s by another nation state. For example, dissuasion promotion of a respective COA by another nation state will be accomplished through “carrots” such as seduction, coaxing, and other similar soft methods. Dissuasion repulsion of a respective COA by another nation state will also be accomplished through “carrots” such as bribery, distractions, and other similar soft methods. Both the desire to promote or repel an action of another nation state can be achieved through dissuasive tactics listed in this paragraph. However, the critical distinction of dissuasive tactics is that they are leveraged with soft methods known as “carrots”.

If deterrence is viewed as “sticks”, deterrence promotion of a respective COA by another nation state will be accomplished through “sticks” such as intimidation, bullying, threatening, and other similar methods. Deterrence repulsion of a respective COA by another nation state will be achieved through overtly implementing sanctions, some sort of attack, or other similar tactics. Both the desire to promote or repel an action of another nation state can be achieved through deterrence tactics listed in this paragraph. However, the important distinction is that the means to accomplish deterrence objectives is with “sticks”.

⁷⁴ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

In order to contribute to clarifying the muddled lines between dissuasion and deterrence, the research following this literature review will delve into instances where dissuasion has been used by the United States against other nation states. Specifically, acts of dissuasion by the United States which will be fleshed out to show how they align with the parameters of dissuasion outlined in the conclusion of this literature review. Ultimately, the research which this literature review precedes will contribute to refining the matrix theory outlined by Bartoh, clarify how dissuasion has historically been used by the United States, and clarify dissuasion's distinction when compared to deterrence.

Methods Section:

According to Sharon Crasnow, “political science research, particularly in the areas of international relations and comparative politics, has increasingly become dominated by statistical and formal approaches, sometimes loosely—and not completely accurately—grouped together as ‘quantitative methods’”.⁷⁵ Moreover, Crasnow explains that “the promise of these approaches—that is, formal methods, such as rational choice and game theory, and powerful statistical methods, such as multiple regression analysis fueled by the increasingly sophisticated use of statistical software packages—has shifted the methodological emphasis away from the traditional case study method of political science, a method that was predominantly qualitative”.⁷⁶ The recent blending of statistical and formal approaches laid out by Crasnow is integral to understanding the method which was undertaken to pursue the research for this thesis.

The research undertaken in this research aims to refrain from utilizing a blended method

⁷⁵ Crasnow, Sharon. "The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science: Evidence for Causal Claims." *Philosophy of Science* 79, no. 5 (2012): 655-66.

⁷⁶ Ibid

of statistical and formal approaches. Rather, due to the theoretical nature of this research, this paper focuses on a classic method of case study which leans on qualitative information which is exploratory, descriptive, interpretive, and explanatory. Particularly, the definitions of deterrence and dissuasion, laid out in the literature review and chapter conclusion, are unpacked based on the aforementioned case study components.

This paper can be expected to focus on differentiating dissuasion from deterrence in a historical context. Through the use of exploration, description, interpretation, and explanation, this paper compellingly finds that dissuasion is indeed different than deterrence, and has been used by the United States in American policy. Crasnow explains that “although increasingly popular in political science—a trend transported from economics—experiments are not always possible, for a variety of reasons. Therefore, observational evidence continues to play an important role in the field”.⁷⁷ The method adopted by this research illuminates the findings by leaning heavily on historical observational evidence.

All in all, it is important to note that the method undertaken to construct the research aims to avoid the pitfall of inaccurately grouping formal and statistical approaches while discussing a topic which is theoretical in nature. On the contrary, this paper works to present a new view on deterrence, and clarify misconceptions between deterrence and dissuasion through a more traditional method of study. Of course, statistical methods were considered for this research. Though, it is not believed that adopting a statistically-focused method of research would have crafted the most compelling case for distinguishing a difference between the utilization of deterrence and dissuasion in American policy.

⁷⁷ Crasnow, Sharon. "The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science: Evidence for Causal Claims." *Philosophy of Science* 79, no. 5 (2012): 655-66.

Presentation and Discussion of Results

Iran Nuclear Deal - Exemplar of American Dissuasion:

Regardless of political opinion, or personal convictions regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal coming to fruition, there is credible reason to view the deal as a tactic of dissuasion implemented by the United States. “After the presidential elections of 14 June 2013, Iran’s Hassan Rouhani proved that he was introducing changes in the country’s foreign policy based on cooperation and moderation as he did when he was nuclear negotiator. The outlook of Rouhani, therefore, created opportunities and opened the door for a rapprochement between Iran and the West.”⁷⁸ The objective of the Iran nuclear deal, according to President Barack Obama, was to “cut off every single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear program, a nuclear weapons program”.⁷⁹ The objective of the deal, at its core, was to preserve American and international security by obstructing the procurement of a nuclear bomb by an unpredictable and dangerous state (Iran).

It is clear that the Iran nuclear deal was not a tactic of deterrence. Deterrence, explained during a hearing with the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC), is a basic equation: deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is too great.⁸⁰ The Iran nuclear deal did not convince Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too great. On the contrary, the Iran nuclear deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition. The JCPOA guided Iran into acting out of its own volition, as

⁷⁸ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Charting Global Transitions. Report. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2015. 160-66.

⁷⁹ Staff, Washington Post. Full Text: Obama's News Conference on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. WP Company, May 1, 2019

⁸⁰ Home: United States Committee on Armed Services. Armed Services Committees.

opposed to forcing Iran into making a fear-based decision. The United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran that, according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition oriented around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon. The United States, through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion by guiding Iran into making a decision by their own volition.

It is important to understand that the Iran Nuclear Deal was a tactic of dissuasion when the tactic of deterrence was still a viable option. In fact, the Iran nuclear deal was diplomatic in nature which is not an attribute of deterrence, but is indeed an attribute of dissuasion. Brian Rathbun explains that “if those in a position of leverage always adopt coercive bargaining, then diplomacy matters little. Moreover, if the strong always get their way, diplomacy is not important”.⁸¹ The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was not deterrence because the deal did not rely on coercion. And, the primary party of strength, the United States, did not entirely get its way either.

The JCPOA utilized strategy rooted in diplomacy to influence the nature of future military competition, and targeted policy which dissuaded Iran from initiating potential future military conflict by having a nuclear weapon. It is apparent that the JCPOA was a clear tactic of dissuasion, but could have filled an even greater dissuasive capacity if it had been continued or reinvented by the Trump Administration. Building upon the JCPOA, or reinventing the JCPOA could have addressed sunset provisions, Iranian support for terrorism, and the future of Iranian ballistic missile programs in a way that did not rely on economic sanctions or militaristic

⁸¹ Rathbun, Brian C. "The Value and Values of Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy's Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East*, 1-21. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2014.

punishment.

Rathbun explains that “while some restrictions in the deal would have expired or ‘sunset’ at different points and would have needed to be addressed in the future, other restrictions lasted more than a decade, and some lasted forever”.⁸² The restrictions in the Obama Administrations JCPOA that lasted forever permanently influenced the nature of future military conflict between the United States and Iranian regime. If the sunset provisions had been altered or modified by the Trump administration to last forever, that also would have influenced the nature of potential future military conflict between the United States and Iran.

The path of diplomacy is a decision by the Obama Administration which posed a stark difference to the contemporary approach by the Trump Administration. The contemporary approach of interacting with Iran which has been implemented by the Trump Administration has been deterrence-oriented. For example, President Donald Trump has undertaken a maximum economic pressure campaign of sanctioning the Iranian regime, assassinated Iranian General Soleimani, and ultimately withdrew from the dissuasive Iranian nuclear deal.⁸³ If dissuasion were indeed the same as deterrence, the JCPOA would have been a strongly considered avenue for the Trump Administration to pursue. President Donald Trump has proven with his rhetoric that hard power deterrence is his ideal choice of response to a threatening Iranian regime. In January of 2020, President Trump leveraged deterrence-oriented rhetoric from the Oval Office by saying, “let this serve as a warning that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites that will be hit very fast and very hard. The USA wants no more

⁸² Rathbun, Brian C. "The Value and Values of Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy's Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East*, 1-21. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2014.

⁸³ Third Way. Report. Third Way, 2020.

threats”.⁸⁴

It is important to recognize that the Trump administration has undertaken a deterrence-oriented approach against Iran, because that approach proves that the United States is a hard power capable nation state in the relationship between America and Iran. That being said, it is also important to recognize that the Obama Administration leveraged dissuasion against Iran with the JCPOA. It is critical to recognize that the United States has used both deterrence and dissuasion against Iran in the two most recent Presidential administrations, because the utilization of both tactics highlights that both dissuasion and deterrence can be wielded by a superior nation state. That being said, the ultimate concept which the Iranian nuclear deal should promote, is that the United States has indeed used dissuasion in American policy. The JCPOA is a historical instance of American dissuasion.

Taiwan Relations Act, Strategic Ambiguity, and American Dissuasion:

Chapter one of this thesis discussed the manner in which Taiwan utilized dissuasion against mainland China. Specifically, Taiwan leveraged the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a form of strategic ambiguity to increase the likelihood of mainland China choosing to refrain from attacking Taiwan. As mentioned in the preceding chapter of this thesis, the Taiwan Relations Act allows for arms sales from the United States to Taiwan for self-defense and does not rule out the possibility of the United States defending Taiwan from Chinese attack. This is a policy known as strategic ambiguity.⁸⁵ Due to the lack of hard power deterrence capability of

⁸⁴ Wright, Thomas. How Donald Trump Thinks about Iran. Brookings. Brookings, January 7, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/07/how-donald-trump-thinks-about-iran/>.

⁸⁵ Albert, E. (n.d.). China-Taiwan Relations. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations>

Taiwan, the TRA is certainly an instance of Taiwan wielding dissuasion against China. The TRA is also an instance of the United States wielding dissuasion against China. As previously mentioned, dissuasion is “utilizing strategy and actions to influence the nature of future military competitions, and channels threats in certain directions complicating military planning for adversaries”.⁸⁶ The TRA accomplishes the objectives in the aforementioned sentence for Taiwan and the United States alike. Strategic ambiguity benefits the Taiwanese, as well as the United States. The realization of the TRA as a tactic of dissuasion on behalf of the United States again shows that dissuasion can and has been wielded by a deterrence-capable nation state. In this case, the deterrence-capable state is America.

The premise of the TRA being a form of dissuasion by the US (instead of deterrence) is oriented around the lack of an explicit threat from the United States against China. The lack of an explicit threat from the United States is an important distinction between dissuasion and deterrence. For example, Karl Mueller articulates that threat of punishment is the approach most strongly associated with deterrence, and involves nonmilitary (economic) and military action.⁸⁷ Therefore, because there is not an explicit threat from the United States against China in regards to the ambiguity provided to Taiwan by the TRA, this thesis research interprets the TRA as a tactic of dissuasion implemented by the United States. Moreover, the TRA is a diplomatic interaction between the United States and Taiwan. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, diplomacy is a trait of dissuasion, but not of deterrence. Subsequently, it is clear that the TRA is not a tactic of deterrence. Rather, the TRA is a tactic of dissuasion.

⁸⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

⁸⁷ Mueller, Karl P. "Conventional Deterrence Redux: Avoiding Great Power Conflict in the 21st Century." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2018): 76-93.

It is no secret that the United States and China are two major super powers battling within the contemporary great power competition. Therefore, it is useful for American policymakers to enhance American superiority by establishing an American-friendly democracy just off of the coast of China. The Taiwan Relations Act facilitates accomplishing that objective by injecting strategic ambiguity into the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.

In order to further understand how the United States diplomatically wielded dissuasion with the TRA through Taiwan, it is critical to understand strategic ambiguity in depth. Baliga explains that “countries sometimes try to create ambiguity about their military capabilities”.⁸⁸ Or, in the case of the United States with Taiwan, create ambiguity about the support from a country (United States) with significant military capabilities. Strategic ambiguity has been used many times historically. One particularly significant historical example is that of Saddam Hussein in the early and late 1990’s. “Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the early 1990s but not in the late 1990s, and deliberately chose a policy of ambiguity in both situations because he felt it worked to his advantage.”⁸⁹

According to Baliga, “a country that lacks WMDs may use strategic ambiguity to create ‘deterrence by doubt’.”⁹⁰ Respectfully, this research does not agree with Baliga in the interpretation of strategic ambiguity being a form of deterrence (by doubt). On the contrary, Baliga is explaining a distinction from the commonplace interpretation of deterrence. It is

⁸⁸ Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjöström. "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation." *Journal of Political Economy* 116, no. 6 (2008): 1023-057.

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

problematic to classify strategic ambiguity as “deterrence by doubt” for the same reason it is problematic to categorize the capability to deny another party any gains from a move which is to be deterred⁹¹ as “deterrence by denial”. As mentioned in the literature review of this chapter, “extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates distinctions on which critical reasoning and effective communication depend”.⁹²

In the case of Saddam Hussein, Hussein felt that the perception he may have WMDs was valuable to project strength. For example, “when Saddam Hussein revealed to his inner circle that Iraq had no WMDs, he flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary because he thought such a revelation would embolden his enemies to attack.”⁹³ The concept understood by Saddam Hussein is similar to that of Taiwan and the United States regarding the TRA.

Ambiguity has also been leveraged by Israel. “Israel’s policy of strategic ambiguity on nuclear weapons may be ‘a way of creating a deterrent, without making it explicit’”.⁹⁴ Again, this research suggests Israel is using dissuasion as opposed to deterrence, because extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates distinctions on which critical reasoning and effective communication depend.⁹⁵ Taiwan, Israel, and Saddam Hussein all utilized dissuasion. And, arguably, all of the players mentioned in the previous sentence can be viewed as less-capable nation states in comparison to the primary adversaries

⁹¹ Paul Davis, “Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial: Using Simple Cognitive Models of the Adversary to Inform Strategy” (Rand Corporation, January 2014)

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjöström. "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation." *Journal of Political Economy* 116, no. 6 (2008): 1023-057.

⁹⁵ Paul Davis, “Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial: Using Simple Cognitive Models of the Adversary to Inform Strategy” (Rand Corporation, January 2014)

their dissuasion tactics were directed against. The fact that strategic ambiguity was used by less-capable nation states against economically or militaristically superior adversaries shows that strategic ambiguity is a form of dissuasion, because hard-power deterrence was not a tool at their disposal.

In the case of the United States, Taiwan, and the TRA, strategic ambiguity is simply a layer within dissuasion to guide mainland China away from conducting a military strike against Taiwan. As was mentioned earlier in the introduction of this thesis chapter, dissuasion can be leveraged by deterrence-capable parties and non-deterrence capable parties. Therefore, because there is no explicit threat from the United States, the injection of strategic ambiguity into the relationship between Taiwan and China through the TRA is an example of American dissuasion.

Israel, Nuclear Ambiguity, and American Dissuasion:

If dissuasion is simply “utilizing strategy and actions to channel threats in certain directions, and complicate military planning for adversaries”⁹⁶, it can be gathered that the United States bolstering Israel’s nuclear ambiguity is another instance of American dissuasion being implemented in American policy. “Israel is the world’s oldest closet nuclear state. For more than forty years it has neither confirmed nor denied its possession of nuclear weapons, and has vowed not to be the first to ‘introduce’ nuclear weapons into the Middle East (with the definition of ‘introduce’ being left intentionally vague).”⁹⁷

Moreover, Vipin Narang explains that Israel has circulated enough credible rumors to

⁹⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

⁹⁷ Narang, Vipin. "Israel." In *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*, 179-206. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014.

support the assertion that Israel does indeed possess nuclear weapons.⁹⁸ The deliberate ambiguity leveraged by Israel, similar to that of Taiwan with the TRA, can be viewed as a tactic of dissuasion against superior adversaries. Though, for the purposes of this chapter, this research will be analyzing how the United States has diplomatically facilitated the ambiguity perpetuated by Israel. Thus, this section will once again highlight how dissuasion has historically been used by the United States.

The United States has leaned on Israel as a pawn in the struggle for influence over the Middle East. “The specter of atomic warfare in the Middle East has placed the region's nuclearization at the heart not only of US-Israeli relations, but also at the center of Israel's drive to preserve its regional nuclear hegemony.”⁹⁹ Considering that the specter of atomic warfare in the Middle East has placed nuclearization at the heart of US-Israeli relations, it is critical to assess and understand how the United States has deliberately contributed to the credibility of Israel possessing nuclear weapons. Additionally, it is important to understand how the United States has also deliberately contributed to the continued ambiguity of Israel possessing nuclear weapons. A clear understanding of the aforementioned roles of the United States will highlight how dissuasion was deliberately utilized in American policy.

The beginning of the Persian Gulf War is a clear instance of where American policy with Israel supported the notion of Israel possibly possessing nuclear weapons, as well as upheld the nuclear ambiguity Israel has sought to project. “Once the Persian Gulf War began, and Iraq

⁹⁸ Narang, Vipin. "Israel." In *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*, 179-206. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014.

⁹⁹ Aronson, Geoffrey. "Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question." *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 4 (1992): 617-30.

launched Scud missiles against Israel, the United States adopted a two-track policy of publicly acknowledging an Israeli right to respond with nonconventional weapons to an Iraqi chemical attack, while privately counseling the Shamir government to exercise restraint.”¹⁰⁰ The decision to acknowledge an Israeli right to respond with nonconventional weapons to an Iraqi chemical attack is a clear decision to support the assertion that Israel potentially possessed nuclear weapons. However, by the United States refraining from overtly expressing that Israel did indeed have nuclear weapons, the US contributed to the nuclear ambiguity which Israel projected at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War. The two-track policy adopted by the United States at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War was a deliberate and decisive leveraging of dissuasion.

It is important to understand that the two-track policy approach of the United States with Israel during the start of the Persian Gulf War was not a form of deterrence. In fact, the two-track policy approach did not fulfill the attributes required of deterrence for one fundamental reason: the United States did not make an explicit threat to retaliate with hard power against Iraq should it attack Israel with chemical weapons. As mentioned in the previous section of this thesis chapter, threat of punishment is the approach most strongly associated with deterrence, and involves nonmilitary (economic) and military action.¹⁰¹

Though there was an explicit threat offered from Israel against Iraq, there was no explicit threat from the United States against Iraq. The lack of an explicit hard power threat from the United States against Iraq is a fundamental underpinning as to why the two-pronged

¹⁰⁰ Aronson, Geoffrey. "Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question." *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 4 (1992): 617-30.

¹⁰¹ Mueller, Karl P. "Conventional Deterrence Redux: Avoiding Great Power Conflict in the 21st Century." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2018): 76-93.

American approach at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War was not an example of American deterrence. The United States strategically leaned on Israel as a pawn to deter Iraq, and the leveraging of Israeli deterrence was in fact dissuasion by the United States. The “endorsement” of the United States supporting Israel responding to an Iraqi chemical attack with nonconventional weapons (possibly nuclear) was merely an act which was diplomatic in nature. There was no threat from the United States. Moreover, American support of Israel to use nonconventional weapons was not an act of deterrence by the United States itself. Rather, US support of Israel using “nonconventional weapons” was tactic of dissuasion, diplomatic in nature, which hinged on an ambiguous threat of deterrence (potentially nuclear) from Israel against Iraq.

Conclusion

History has supported the assertion that dissuasion is a tactic which has been used in American policy. History has also supported the assertion that dissuasion and deterrence share differences in policy, just as the two terms differ in definition. As explained in the literature review, “the word ‘de-terrence’ in English consists of two parts that go back to (at least) ancient Latin. The ‘de’-prefix in ‘de’-terrence – similarly to so many other common verbs like deflect, depart, detach, derail, deviate, defend etc. – connotes ‘away from’.”¹⁰² Moreover, “The ‘-terrence’ part will for most people (accurately) trigger associations with the word ‘terror’, which derives from the Latin verb *terrere* ‘fill with fear, frighten’.”¹⁰³ The origins and background of the term “deterrence” illuminate how the term “dissuasion” is inherently different in definition,

¹⁰² David Yost, “Debating Security Strategies,” *Nato Review*, accessed October 6, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art4.html>.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*

and guided this research into exemplifying that dissuasion and deterrence are also different in practice. Compelling examples comprising this research provide evidence that dissuasion has indeed been used in American policy through utilizing the contrasting definition of deterrence against dissuasion as a baseline.

By definition, deterrence-motivated refrainment from a desired action is rooted in an underlying or overt threat should the action be pursued. Dissuasion, as a separate tactic, refers to guiding someone into doing something out of their own volition.¹⁰⁴ Volition, would be acting out of will without threat from the party implementing dissuasion. The decision of taking a specific course of action out of will of is a critical distinction when compared to taking a specific course of action out of fear of an explicit threat.

The example of the United States leveraging the TRA with Taiwan to mitigate the likelihood of a mainland China attack against Taiwan is an example of dissuasion. Using the TRA as a tool of dissuasion guides China into acting out of its own volition in refraining from attacking Taiwan, but not out of explicitly being strong-armed due to a hard power threat from the United States. Leveraging the TRA yields no consideration of an explicit or overt threat from the United States against mainland China should there be an attack against Taiwan. So, it can be gathered that strategic ambiguity being injected in the relationship between Taiwan and China was a tactic of dissuasion by America. Of course, as this paper outlines, the TRA is diplomatic innature. So, the U.S. diplomatically leveraging the TRA without ever overtly threatening China “checks the box” as a tactic of dissuasion. Recall, diplomacy is an attribute of

¹⁰⁴ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

dissuasion.

Similarly, the example of the United States adopting a two-pronged policy approach with Israel at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War was also an example of American dissuasion. “Endorsing” the use of Israeli nonconventional weapons as a response to a chemical attack from Iraq offered credibility to the claim that Israel potentially possessed nuclear weapons. However, refraining from explicitly acknowledging that Israel possessed nuclear weapons bolstered the strategic ambiguity which the Israeli government has sought to project.

The injection of strategic ambiguity in the contentious relationship between Israel and Iraq at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War acted as a dissuasive tactic in the same manner that strategic ambiguity did with the TRA. Yes, the United States did indeed lean on a threat of deterrence by Israel. However, the United States itself did not threaten hard power deterrence against Iraq. Therefore, because there was no explicit threat militaristically or economically from the United States against Iraq, leaning on Israel as a pawn in deterring Iraq from taking an unfavorable course of action was indeed an example of American implemented dissuasion.

Lastly, and possibly most convincingly, the United States utilized dissuasion against Iran with the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). The difference between the historical instance of the JCPOA and those of Taiwan and Israel (as mentioned in this paper), is that the JCPOA was a direct dissuasive tactic between the United States and Iran. The JCPOA utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition, which is an attribute of dissuasion. Additionally, the Iran Nuclear Deal administered targeted policy which prompted Iran to refrain from initiating future military conflict through Iranian volition. And, of course, the JCPOA was also diplomatic in nature. All components considered, the JCPOA also “checks

the box” to be viewed as a tactic of dissuasion implemented in American policy.

All in all, this chapter has aimed to highlight several historical examples of where dissuasion has been used in American policy. It is critical to understand that dissuasion is a tactic which has either been confused with deterrence in American policy, or used and not acknowledged adequately. This research addresses the question of: “so what?”. It is imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion, because an understanding of the differentiation between the two concepts will yield stronger American policy, and enhance American security.

This paper has articulately, pragmatically, and methodically exemplified how dissuasion has been used historically in American policy. Moving forward, based on history, this paper believes it can be anticipated that dissuasion will be used again in American policy. If the United States intends to keep pace in the new great power competition with adversaries, there ought to be a clear understanding of dissuasion across the board so that sound policy can be crafted to meet the needs of the future. It is the hope of this paper that sound policy will be a byproduct of a deepened understanding of the distinctions between deterrence, dissuasion, and how both have historically been used in American policy.

Chapter 3

Introduction:

Chapter one of this thesis highlighted the fundamental differences between dissuasion and deterrence. Comprehensively, the initial chapter of this thesis established that dissuasion,

in itself, is a unique concept and tactic within the practice of policy making. Establishing that dissuasion is indeed a tool which is wielded within policy creation uniquely, the first chapter of this research illuminated a historically ever-present “hole” which has posed an obstacle to scholars and policymakers alike. Illuminating and defining the parameters of what constitutes dissuasion allowed for this research to highlight examples of where dissuasion has been used historically.

Chapter two of this thesis used the established parameters of dissuasion to point out moments in history where dissuasion was used, and at several points, where dissuasion was inaccurately categorized as deterrence. Notably, the most compelling instance of dissuasion which was discussed in the preceding chapter of this thesis was the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). As mentioned in chapter two, it is clear that the Iran nuclear deal was not a tactic of deterrence. Deterrence, explained during a hearing with the Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC), is a basic equation: deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is too great. The Iran nuclear deal did not convince Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too great.¹⁰⁵ On the contrary, the Iran Nuclear Deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition.

The United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran that, according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition oriented around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon. The United States, through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion. Also as was highlighted in the

¹⁰⁵ Home: United States Committee on armed services. (n.d.).

preceding chapter of this thesis, the dissuasive JCPOA deal leveraged under the Obama administration was strikingly different than the approach adopted by the Trump administration.

The approach of interacting with Iran which was adopted by the Trump Administration was deterrence-oriented. For example, President Donald Trump undertook a maximum economic pressure campaign of sanctioning the Iranian regime, assassinated Iranian General Soleimani, and ultimately withdrew from the dissuasive Iranian nuclear deal of the Obama administration¹⁰⁶. Moreover, President Trump proved with his rhetoric that hard power deterrence was his ideal choice of response to a threatening Iranian government. In January of 2020, President Trump leveraged deterrence-oriented rhetoric from the Oval Office by saying, “let this serve as a warning that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites that will be hit very fast and very hard. The USA wants no more threats”¹⁰⁷.

If dissuasion were indeed the same as deterrence, the JCPOA would have been a strongly considered avenue for the Trump Administration to pursue. It is critical to recognize that the United States has used both deterrence and dissuasion against Iran in the two previous Presidential administrations, because the utilization of both tactics highlights that dissuasion and deterrence can indeed be wielded by the United States. Moreover, it is critical to this third chapter of this thesis to recognize that the dissuasive 2015 JCPOA was done under an administration that consisted of Joe Biden as Vice President.

Contemporarily, the White House is now occupied by the Biden Administration. This third thesis chapter is going to outline the anticipated approach of the Biden Administration to interacting with Iran. Specifically, this third chapter is going to flesh out how this research expects the Biden Administration to attempt the creation of a new nuclear deal between the

¹⁰⁶ Third Way. Report. Third Way, 2020.

¹⁰⁷ Wright, Thomas. How Donald Trump Thinks about Iran. Brookings. Brookings, January 7, 2020.

United States and Iran. It is important to note that there is an anticipation by this research to see the 2015 JCPOA used as a baseline for a future deal between the United States and Iran. Of course, since the 2015 JCPOA is expected to be used as a baseline, a new nuclear deal which is created under the Biden Administration is expected to be a tactic of dissuasion. This chapter will outline how the Biden Administration will potentially go about pursuing a new nuclear deal. Therefore, prior to outlining the anticipated attempt to create a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran, it is imperative that this chapter provides a literature review to bring readers up to speed on the pertinent facets of the 2015 JCPOA.

Literature Review

Schools of Thought:

When put into motion, “the 2015 Iran nuclear deal was not without its detractors. The Iranian Conservative Party, the US Republican Party and Israel disapproved”¹⁰⁸. Additionally, “the 15-year implementation process of the deal was likely to be affected by the state-centric Constitution of Iran, which left no room for foreign and, in particular, Western considerations, and US Republicans feared for the security of the state of Israel.”¹⁰⁹ Concerns also stemmed beyond the previously mentioned groups. “Other objections came from Arab Sunni States as well as US Democrats also concerned about Israeli security”.¹¹⁰

While the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed to in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between the E3+3 and P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, was considered by many as the crowning achievement of a 12-year process of diplomatic negotiation, there was serious concern

¹⁰⁸ Viaud, Astrid. Report. Egmont Institute, 2016. Accessed February 17, 2021.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Viaud, Astrid. Report. Egmont Institute, 2016. Accessed February 17, 2021.

that the agreement would not adequately or safely resolve the international security crisis posed by the clandestine and unidentified nature of the Iranian nuclear activities first noticed in 2003¹¹¹. The objective of the E3+3 and P5+1 deal was to ensure that the Iranian nuclear program was developed for civilian and non-military purposes by asking Iran to cease its uranium and plutonium enrichment, and to authorize inspections and checks carried out by nuclear experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on nuclear sites¹¹². Additionally, the E3+3 and P5+1 deal maintained an arms embargo in order to prevent the spread of offensive weapons and the transfer of ballistic missiles to Iran; duties were accompanied by incentives¹¹³.

Detractors of the deal, as mentioned earlier in this literature review, reproached the negotiating team for conceding too much in order to safeguard the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at all costs before the end of political mandates¹¹⁴. Additionally, criticism was drawn regarding sunset provisions, Iranian support for terrorism, and the future of Iranian ballistic missile programs in a way that did not rely on economic sanctions or militaristic punishment. Brian Rathbun explains that “while some restrictions in the deal would have expired or ‘sunset’ at different points and would have needed to be addressed in the future, other restrictions lasted more than a decade, and some lasted forever”¹¹⁵. Specifically, it was the sunset restrictions that garnered stark opposition.

Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) - Tactic of Dissuasion

¹¹¹ Ibid

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Ibid

¹¹⁵ Rathbun, Brian C. "The Value and Values of Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy's Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East*, 1-21. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2014.

Dissuasion, as articulated by Batoh, “refers not to *what* is to be achieved but to *how* – the means that are employed to get there”. Therefore, according to Batoh, there must be two conceivable options with this distinction. Simply, one of those options involves positive incentives (carrots), the other relies on disincentives (sticks)¹¹⁶. Chapter two of this thesis explains that dissuasion ought to be viewed as “carrots” and deterrence ought to be viewed as “sticks”; both of which can promote or repel courses of action by another nation state.

Bearing in mind the essence and composition of “dissuasion”, it is imperative that the dissuasive nature of the 2015 JCPOA is understood by the reader of this chapter. The objective of the Iran nuclear deal, according to President Barack Obama, was to “cut off every single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear program, a nuclear weapons program”¹¹⁷. The goal of the deal, at its core, was to preserve American and international security by obstructing the procurement of a nuclear bomb by an unpredictable and dangerous state (Iran).

It is clear that the Iran nuclear deal was not a tactic of deterrence. Deterrence, as previously mentioned, is a basic equation: deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is too great¹¹⁸. On the contrary, in tandem with the 2001 QDR, the JCPOA aimed to utilize strategy and actions to influence the threat of Iran in a certain direction by complicating military planning with well-targeted strategy and policy. The 2015 JCPOA aimed to dissuade Iran from initiating future military competitions¹¹⁹. Moreover, it is important to understand that the Iran Nuclear Deal was a tactic of dissuasion when the tactic of deterrence was still a viable option. The understanding of how dissuasion was a deliberately

¹¹⁶ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

¹¹⁷ Staff, Washington Post. Full Text: Obama's News Conference on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. WP Company, May 1, 2019

¹¹⁸ Home: United States Committee on Armed Services. Armed Services Committees.

¹¹⁹ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001

chosen tactic when deterrence was a viable option is vital in differentiating the two phenomenas and accurately classifying the JCPOA as dissuasive.

The Iran Nuclear Deal was diplomatic in nature which is not an attribute of deterrence, but is indeed an attribute of dissuasion. Brian Rathbun explains that “if those in a position of leverage always adopt coercive bargaining, then diplomacy matters little. Moreover, if the strong always get their way, diplomacy is not important”¹²⁰. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was not deterrence because the deal did not rely on coercion. And, notably, the primary party of strength, the United States, did not entirely get its way either. And, as mentioned in the preceding chapter of this thesis, the JCPOA utilized strategy rooted in diplomacy to influence the nature of future military competition, and targeted policy which dissuaded Iran from initiating potential future military conflict by having a nuclear weapon.

Conclusion:

Compellingly, a thorough review of literature regarding the 2015 JCPOA yields the determination that the JCPOA was a tactic of dissuasion. Moreover, a thorough review of literature regarding the 2015 JCPOA yields the determination that there were substantial deficiencies with the final product which was churned out under the Obama Administration. Contemporarily, “Biden has outlined his commitment to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons and to return the United States to the JCPOA if Iran fulfills its obligations, as outlined in the agreement”¹²¹. Therefore, it can be anticipated President Joe Biden in will also pursue a dissuasive deal with Iran, just as Barack Obama did in 2015.

¹²⁰ Rathbun, Brian C. "The Value and Values of Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy's Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East*, 1-21. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2014.

¹²¹ Hatuel-Radoshitzky, Michal, and Eldad Shavit. Report. Institute for National Security Studies, 2020. Accessed March 10, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep27773.

Though there is reason to believe President Joe Biden will pursue another dissuasive deal with Iran, this research anticipates that President Biden will work to create a deal which parallels that of the 2015 JCPOA, while also addressing deficiencies and downfalls of the 2015 JCPOA which were highlighted in this literature review. There is evidence to expect “continued negotiations – together with European partners – to extend the limits stipulated in the original deal, and address regional tensions in a revised agreement”¹²². Specifically, this research anticipates the Biden administration to address particular facets of the 2015 JCPOA highlighted by former Special Advisor for the State Department’s Iran Action Group, Gabriel Noronha.

Noronha explains that the exit and strategy of the United States withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal in May of 2018 was geared towards depriving the Iranian regime of revenue used to conduct activity. Specifically, the deprivation of revenue since the withdraw of the United States from the JCPOA can be assessed as a segue into guiding Iran back to the negotiating table for a better deal¹²³. According to Noronha, “U.S. sanctions deprived the Iranian regime of more than \$70 billion dollars that forced it to cut payments to Hamas and Hezbollah, shutter multiple propaganda channels, and cut this year’s proposed military budget by 24%”¹²⁴. Now, the United States has the opportunity to clinch a new dissuasive deal that satisfies ills of the 2015 JCPOA detractors. The subsequent portions of this thesis chapter will outline how

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

¹²⁴ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

exactly the Biden Administration aims to clinch a dissuasive deal which remedies the ailments highlighted by detractors of the 2015 JCPOA.

Presentation and Discussion:

New Nuclear Deal - What *shouldn't* it look like?

Explicitly, former Special Advisor for the State Department's Iran Action Group, Gabriel Noronha, explains that a new deal which is pursued with Iran should not look like the JCPOA in specific regards. This research, of course, concurs with Noronha. Particularly, Noronha highlights that a return to the JCPOA is Iran's ardent hope, but indulging the regime and discarding American leverage would be a historic blunder¹²⁵. In fact, Noronha specifically touches on the sunset provisions mentioned in the literature review of this chapter.

The JCPOA's sunset clauses, as stated by Noronha on unrestricted nuclear activity, are now more than five years closer to expiration. Iran has built the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East, but the JCPOA imposed no real restrictions on those armaments¹²⁶. Moreover, according to Noronha, the deal also did not do anything to erode Iran's support for terrorism or halt its hostage-taking¹²⁷. The lack of attention toward combating Iranian support of terrorism is one of the major concerns of detractors of the JCPOA.

A new deal under the Biden Administration, based on the findings of this research, will steer clear of any form which offers the appearance of disregarding the security of Israel. In fact, "on issues regarding Israel, President Biden ascribes strategic importance to bilateral relations

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Ibid

with Israel and has already proven to be its great ally”¹²⁸. For example, according to Hatuel-Radoshitzky, “campaign pledges indicate that Biden will remain committed to preserve Israel's qualitative military edge (QME), will not condition continued defense assistance on a change in Israeli policy, and will not move the US Embassy from its Jerusalem site.”¹²⁹

The JCPOA established under the Obama administration did not consist of addressing US Republicans fears for the security of the state of Israel. Additionally, the 2015 JCPOA did not remedy other objections from Arab Sunni States as well as US Democrats also concerned about Israeli security”¹³⁰. Noronha alluded to the disregard for Israeli security in the 2015 JCPOA by encouraging the Biden Administration to listen when Israel and Arab nations speak with one voice against reentering the original JCPOA¹³¹. The “one voice” referenced by Noronha refers to the security and safety (or lack thereof) of Israel under the JCPOA. This research finds that a Biden Administration will listen to the “one voice” of Israel and Arab nations against reentering the original JCPOA without a revised approach. That being said, a new deal in itself will indeed remain a tactic of dissuasion.

New Nuclear Deal - What *should* it look like?

The Biden Administration, based on the contemporary environment of international affairs and American politics, will likely aim to pursue a deal with Iran that acts more as a means

¹²⁸ Hatuel-Radoshitzky, Michal, and Eldad Shavit. Report. Institute for National Security Studies, 2020. Accessed March 10, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep27773.

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Viaud, Astrid. Report. Egmont Institute, 2016. Accessed February 17, 2021.

¹³¹ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

to an end, not an end in itself¹³². The approach of pursuing a deal which is a means to an end, as opposed to an end in itself, is critical to this research for several reasons. In accordance with Noronha, this research finds that the Biden Administration will find it critical for a new deal to address the full range of Iran's behavior, not merely place modest and temporary restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and hope Iran is willing to negotiate further. Negotiations will likely be conducted from a position of strength. Which, due to pressure from economic sanctions by the previous Trump administration¹³³, has been established.

The position of strength which has been cultivated by the economic sanctions of the Trump Administration yields an opportunity for the Biden Administration to negotiate from a standpoint which was not utilized under the Obama Administration during the crafting of the original JCPOA. Therefore, it can be anticipated that a strong negotiating approach will be undertaken by the Biden Administration. And, subsequently, a new nuclear deal will reflect that revised approach. A new deal shouldn't be negotiated from a position of weakness, and this research anticipates the Biden Administration will follow that credo.

Considering the anticipation of a deal which is pursued from a position of strength, there is reason to believe that a bipartisan product can be expected. Notably, when recognizing the tied Senate President Biden is operating with in the United States Senate amid the first session of the 117th congress, there is legitimate reason to expect a deal which acknowledges bipartisan concerns. In fact, in order for a new deal to withstand a Senate requiring a Vice Presidential tie-breaking vote, the Biden Administration will likely aim to find a common ground which Congress at-large can tolerate.

¹³² Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

¹³³ Ibid

According to Hatuel-Radoshitzky, election results (particularly with a tied senate) “may force Biden to cooperate with moderate Republicans – against the will of the progressive Democratic wing – in order to promote legislative initiatives such as a new nuclear deal with Iran”¹³⁴. This research expects the Biden Administration will achieve a bipartisan product by addressing the key points outlined in the previous paragraphs of the presentation and discussion portion of this thesis. Notably, achieving a bipartisan product is an important distinction from the 2015 JCPOA, which did not garner at-large congressional support.

According to Noronha, “congressional support is critical to the success of any arrangement such as a new nuclear deal with Iran. And, though it never came to fruition, the Trump Administration did repeatedly pledge to establish a deal which possessed congressional support”¹³⁵. Therefore, it can be further understood that the current landscape between the United States and Iran is conducive for a new deal to be embarked upon. And, if successful, the Biden Administration can claim it followed through on the failed promise of the Trump Administration to craft a deal which enjoys congressional support. And, again, based on the stances taken during the Biden Presidential campaign, it is anticipated that the Biden Administration will aim to achieve this goal while paralleling the successful components of the 2015 JCPOA. That being said, this research expects attempted remedy of the concerns of 2015 JCPOA detractors as a byproduct of a tied Senate.

Kelsey Davenport, with the Arms Control Association, explains that “under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the president must issue a certification to Congress

¹³⁴ Hatuel-Radoshitzky, Michal, and Eldad Shavit. Report. Institute for National Security Studies, 2020. Accessed March 10, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep27773.

¹³⁵ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

every 90 days that is tied to Iran’s performance under the multilateral nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Failure to issue the certification gives Congress the option to introduce legislation reimposing U.S. sanctions waived or suspended under the JCPOA on an expedited schedule”¹³⁶. It is critical to recognize that the legal requirement of garnering congressional support for a new deal with Iran stems from a law which was signed into action by former President Barack Obama while Joe Biden resided as Vice President.

According to Noronha, “the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, signed into law by former President Barack Obama in 2015, requires any ‘agreement,’ regardless of the form it takes, to be submitted to Congress for review. The law also specifies this requirement applies to ‘any related agreements ... whether entered into or implemented in the future,’ relevant to the scenario we face today”¹³⁷. Simply, it ought to be legally expected that “any agreement, or attempt to return to the JCPOA, that circumvents Congress would be both unlawful and doomed to fail yet again”¹³⁸. Should the Biden Administration aim to pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran, it can be anticipated that the INARA will be a guiding benchmark. Therefore, any legally obtained agreement will reflect satisfied concerns of detractors of the original JCPOA. And, of course, the deal as a whole will still be a tactic of dissuasion on behalf of the United States.

New Nuclear Deal - Why Iran *should* agree?

¹³⁶ Arms control now. (n.d.). Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2017-08-29/understanding-us-compliance-certification-why-matters-iran-nuclear-deal>

¹³⁷ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

¹³⁸ Ibid

There is also incentive on the part of Iran to see a bipartisan deal reached within the American political system. According to Noronha, “if President Biden attempted to pursue a deal which did not receive congressional support, Republicans, including those who might ascend to the Oval Office in 2024, will justifiably warn Iran they will not honor the same deal former President Donald Trump withdrew from¹³⁹. If exercising prudent and pragmatic foresight, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will also come to this realization. Should this proposed realization by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei come to fruition, he will likely understand the economic ramifications or benefits should a sustainable new nuclear deal be reached or unsuccessful.

Economically, international businesses are likely to understand the consequences of a Republican eventually ascending to the Oval Office and ultimately withdrawing from a deal which was established by the Biden Administration¹⁴⁰. Inversely, international businesses are also likely to understand and recognize the benefits of deal established under the Biden Administration which enjoys congressional support and is sustainable. Wisely, Noronha explains that it would be advantageous to the “Iranian regime to ensure bipartisan agreement for any deal it strikes, rather than mollifying just one political party”¹⁴¹. This, in itself, is a compelling reason for Iran to seek a new nuclear deal with the United States. And, this is a compelling reason to anticipate the Biden Administration to pursue a new dissuasive nuclear deal with Iran.

Advantages which can be associated with a prudent, calculated, and congressionally supported deal are substantial. For example, according to Noronha, “critics, supporters, and foreign governments party to the agreement will all know the new deal is binding. Therefore,

¹³⁹ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

¹⁴¹ Ibid

future administrations will find it more difficult to withdraw from the new deal”¹⁴². Additionally, “bipartisan support for such a deal, with restrictions that will not expire, will decrease the chances that the ayatollahs violate it”¹⁴³. Noronha even suggests a treaty to accomplish this task.

Additional benefits of a bipartisan legally binding nuclear deal will include giving international businesses clarity on long term investment decisions with Iran¹⁴⁴. The Biden Administration and the Iranian Supreme Leader ought to see this, and approach a new deal accordingly. Long term investments from the international business community will boost economic prosperity of Iran as a whole, subsequently benefitting the Iranian people. There is compelling evidence to expect Iran being prone to engage in negotiations for a new nuclear deal. Likewise, the compelling evidence of Iran engaging in a deal will likely be noted by the Biden Administration, and play a role in pushing the President and his advisors to propose the initiative of a new dissuasive deal to Congress.

New Nuclear Deal - How *should* it happen?

Optimistically, there is a path forward for the Biden administration to create such an arrangement with the “legs” to go the distance. Simply, the Biden Administration may pledge to bring any deal to the Senate for approval¹⁴⁵. Should this happen, the tied Senate will allow

¹⁴² Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

¹⁴⁵ Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/oped/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

Republicans the leverage to ensure that a tolerable binding deal is obtained. And, of course, with the intention of crafting a sustainable deal bearing congressional support, the Biden Administration will adopt Republican concerns during careful formulation to avoid a historic blunder.

Anticipated by this research, the Biden Administration will consult with Republicans in the Senate which possess concern regarding sunset provisions in the former JCPOA. Additionally, there will be dialogue between the Executive Branch and members of both sides of the political aisle about ensuring Israeli security under the creation of a new deal. As is stated earlier in this chapter, Israeli security was a concern of both Republicans and Democrats with the 2015 JCPOA. Therefore, in order to garner Congressional support in accordance with the INARA, the Biden Administration will include language within a new nuclear deal which satisfies both Republican and Democrat safety concerns for Israel.

Moreover, should the Biden Administration indeed pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran, there will be a substantial consideration of the implementation process of a new deal. Particularly, this research anticipates that the Biden Administration will aim to mitigate influence of the state-centric Constitution of Iran. As stated earlier in this paper, the 15-year implementation process of the 2015 JCPOA was likely to be affected by the state-centric Constitution of Iran. A concerted effort to craft a sustainable congressionally supported new nuclear deal by the Biden Administration will likely attempt and avoid the influence of the state-centric Constitution of Iran. Specifically, a leaning on an implementation process which leverages concerns of detractors of the 2015 JCPOA in Congress will likely satisfy that concern.

Will a new deal be a tactic of dissuasion?

As previously articulated, there is credible reason to view the 2015 JCPOA as a tactic of dissuasion which was implemented by the United States. Hatuel-Radoshitzky articulates that “attempts to anticipate policies and conduct of the incoming Biden administration should factor in the Party’s embrace of multilateralism and the use of diplomatic tools as a means of boosting US soft power in the international arena. In this context, the Biden administration, in contrast to its predecessor, can be expected to step up global cooperation”¹⁴⁶. And, should the Biden Administration use the 2015 JCPOA as a baseline, this research finds that a new deal will also be dissuasive based on the diplomatic nature of global cooperation.

“After the presidential elections of 14 June 2013, Iran’s Hassan Rouhani proved that he was introducing changes in the country’s foreign policy based on cooperation and moderation as he did when he was nuclear negotiator. The outlook of Rouhani, therefore, created opportunities and opened the door for a rapprochement between Iran and the West.”¹⁴⁷ The objective of the JCPOA, according to President Barack Obama, was to “cut off every single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear program, a nuclear weapons program”¹⁴⁸. The objective of the deal, at its core, was to preserve American and international security by obstructing the procurement of a nuclear bomb by an unpredictable and dangerous state (Iran).

As was also explained in the second chapter of this thesis, the JCPOA did not satisfy the definition of deterrence provided at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services: deny the aim of an adversary, or convince the adversary that the cost of pursuing an objective is too great¹⁴⁹. The JCPOA did not convince Iran that the cost of pursuing a nuclear bomb was too

¹⁴⁶ Hatuel-Radoshitzky, Michal, and Eldad Shavit. Report. Institute for National Security Studies, 2020. Accessed March 10, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep27773.

¹⁴⁷ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Charting Global Transitions. Report. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2015. 160-66.

¹⁴⁸ Staff, Washington Post. Full Text: Obama's News Conference on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. WP Company, May 1, 2019

¹⁴⁹ Home: United States Committee on Armed Services. Armed Services Committees.

great. On the contrary, the original Iran nuclear deal utilized strategy to influence the nature of future military competition. Specifically, the United States pursued and enacted a deal with Iran that, according to the Obama Administration, mitigated the likelihood of military competition oriented around a landscape that was comprised of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon. The United States, through the implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, wielded dissuasion.

It is expected by this research that a new deal which is pursued under the Biden Administration will also aim to utilize strategy rooted in diplomacy to influence the nature of future military competition, and target policy which will dissuade Iran from initiating potential future military conflict by having a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it is expected that a new deal under the Biden Administration will also be dissuasive in nature; just as the predeceasing deal under the Obama Administration was. Moreover, just as Iran's Hassan Rouhani proved that he was introducing changes in the country's foreign policy based on cooperation and moderation as he did when he was nuclear negotiator in 2013, there is reason to expect a suitable climate also currently exists for the Biden Administration to move forward with a negotiable Iran toward a new deal.

Contemporarily, Iran is prepared to return to the negotiating table for a new deal. Of course, the scenario Iran finds itself in currently is not by any means the same as what it experienced following the presidential elections in June of 2013. Due to substantial economic pressure through sanctions implemented by the previous Trump administration, the Iranian regime, according to United States CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, has been leveraged into a position where their only real option to retaliate is by attacking. Considering that the only form of retaliation against American deterrence is attacking, there is reason to believe that Iran will want to re-approach the negotiating table to cultivate a more sustainable solution

which benefits Iran. Should “push come to shove”, the United States is significantly the more capable nation state should armed conflict be the ultimate resolution between the US and Iran.

Though the current relationship between the US and Iran is an entirely different dynamic when compared to 2013, this research finds that Iran will indeed want to reengage with discussion to craft a new nuclear deal to avoid “attack” on the United States as the sole tool at their disposal. Should this occur, this research expects a new deal to be a tactic of dissuasion, just as the 2015 was a tactic of dissuasion. The climate, landscape, and status of relations between the United States and Iran is conducive for both parties to aim for a new revitalized dissuasive deal.

Conclusion:

“The president’s role, in principle, is to execute the laws enacted by Congress. Nowhere does the Constitution suggest that the president is expected to take a lead role in lawmaking.”¹⁵⁰ Therefore, it can be gathered that any major deal which is struck between the United States and Iran will consist of substantial Congressional support. That being said, “many presidents have taken a broad view of their responsibilities, and, since the 1930s and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, every president has proposed packages of programs and policies to the Congress. Like his predecessors, upon assuming office in January 2017, President Trump presented Congress with a package of priorities and proposals.”¹⁵¹

There is precedent and framework for the Biden Administration to undertake the ambitious initiative of creating a new dissuasive nuclear deal with Iran. For example, “though

¹⁵⁰ GINSBERG, BENJAMIN, and KATHRYN WAGNER HILL. "Congress, the President, and Domestic Policy: Who Governs?" In *Congress: The First Branch*, 183-212. NEW HAVEN; LONDON: Yale University Press, 2019. Accessed March 8, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd856f.8>.

¹⁵¹ GINSBERG, BENJAMIN, and KATHRYN WAGNER HILL. "Congress, the President, and Domestic Policy: Who Governs?" In *Congress: The First Branch*, 183-212. NEW HAVEN; LONDON: Yale University Press, 2019. Accessed March 8, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd856f.8>.

enacted by Congress, arguably the two most important sets of government programs introduced during the past century - Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society - were developed by these two presidents and their advisers, albeit with some modifications made by Congress"¹⁵². Bearing in mind that Roosevelt's New Deal and Johnson's Great Society were developed by both Presidents and their advisors, it is reasonable to anticipate the same from the Biden Administration in constructing a new nuclear deal with Iran. The environment and precedent of the Executive Branch spearheading a new deal is ripe for the anticipations of a new deal outlined in this chapter to come to fruition.

More importantly to this research as a whole, it is pragmatic to anticipate any new nuclear deal which the Biden Administration attempts to create with Iran will be dissuasive in nature. Should the Biden Administration pursue a new nuclear deal as outlined by this research, the understanding of dissuasion as a tactic and concept in its own right will allow for policymakers, academics, and scholars to begin to close the "hole" in American defense policy planning which was created when the National Defense Strategy (NDS) replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the capstone of strategic guidance to the United States Department of Defense (outlined in the first chapter of this thesis).

As stated in the first chapter of this thesis, the pivot from the QDR to the NDS has undercut the consideration of dissuasion as a tactic within international defense policy, and left US policymakers yearning for clarification regarding how to approach contemporary dilemmas or policy initiatives within the international arena. The current status of relations between the United States and Iran is a pristine exemplar of where policymakers have struggled with approaching and addressing a contemporary dilemma. Recall, United States CENTCOM

¹⁵² Ibid

Commander General McKenzie, testified that Iran has been leveraged into a position where the only tool at their disposal, to combat the United States, is attacking.

Considering that the approach of the Trump Administration was deterrence oriented, it can be gathered that deterrence has essentially failed in terms of reigning in the Iranian regime; nonetheless cultivating a sustainable resolution for the toxic relationship between Iran and the United States. Moreover, due to the JCPOA not being appropriately considered as a tactic of dissuasion when implemented by the Obama administration, the byproduct was a deal which left Congress unsatisfied. Naturally, the JCPOA failed and was withdrawn from by President Trump. The lack of congressional support for the JCPOA can be attributed to a lack of understanding of what the JCPOA truly was. Was the JCPOA a tactic of deterrence? Was the JCPOA a pure tactic of diplomacy? The aforementioned questions remained unanswered due to the inadequate labeling of the JCPOA not as a tactic of dissuasion. Now, due to this research, the JCPOA can be highlighted and understood as a tactic of dissuasion.

Dissuasion is a concept which has been severely neglected as the international landscape shifts with time. Now, should policymakers understand and view dissuasion as a tactic and concept in itself, there can be an expectation for the threshold which ought to be met by new initiatives that are undertaken with the objectives of dissuasion in mind. A new nuclear deal with Iran which parallels the JCPOA is a contemporary dilemma and potential future initiative which can be pursued within the parameters of dissuasion in mind. And, if successful, can aid in the establishing of expectations for the threshold of success of dissuasion-oriented initiatives.

The expectation is simple, and aligns with the definition of dissuasion which was outlined in the QDR prior to the implementation of NDS. Simply, a new nuclear deal with Iran must dissuade Iran from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those

of US allies. “Dissuading” Iran from undertaking such aforementioned programs will consist of an approach which is diplomatic in nature, and utilizes strategy and actions to influence the nature of future military competition with Iran, and channels their threats in a manner which complicates their military planning against the United States¹⁵³.

All in all, it is the intention of this chapter to take the definition and parameters of dissuasion which have been outlined previously in this research, and apply them to a future scenario which will very likely come to fruition. As stated in chapter two of this thesis, and as is true with this third chapter, this research addresses the question of: “so what?” and “what does outlining an anticipated new dissuasive nuclear deal with Iran contribute to this field of study?”. It is imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion, because an understanding of greater depth between the two concepts will yield stronger American policy, and enhance American security.

This research exemplifies how a greater understanding of the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion, by meticulously outlining what logistical facets of a new dissuasive nuclear deal between the United States and Iran will look like, will contribute to preserving American security. This third chapter serves as an exemplar of how utilizing a deeper understanding of dissuasion can be applied to a contemporary contentious relationship experienced by the United States. And, of course, how American security can subsequently be enhanced by crafting a new nuclear deal with Iran which does not simply rely on rendering Iran only capable of responding with an attack.

This third chapter solidifies that dissuasion is indeed a concept of its own through the anticipation and outlining of its use by the Biden Administration with a new nuclear deal with

¹⁵³ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

Iran. Though this chapter is not providing a novel example of dissuasion because it is expected that a new nuclear deal under Biden will parallel the dissuasive JCPOA, this chapter does highlight that a new deal can be expected to be attempted by the Biden team. And, if attempted, a new deal can be properly viewed as a tactic of dissuasion for future use of scholars and policy practitioners. The appropriate viewing of a new nuclear deal as a tactic of dissuasion will provide policy practitioners with insight of what is to be expected of future dissuasive initiatives. And, in accordance with the “so what” of this research, yield stronger policy across the board for years to come.

Conclusion

Comprehensively, the three substantive chapters comprising this thesis have reinforced the conclusion that dissuasion is in fact a tactic in itself. And, if policy creation by the United States in the future is to be properly crafted, policymakers ought to not only understand dissuasion by its defining qualities and parameters, but also anticipate where dissuasion may be used in the future. Chapter one highlights that dissuasion utilizes targeted strategy and policy to complicate planning of another nation state, and can be used by *any* state regardless of deterrence capabilities. Chapter two explains that dissuasion is diplomatic in nature, and guides other nation

states into acting out of their *own* volition. Moreover, chapters one and two together underscore that dissuasion channels threats in certain directions, complicates planning for adversaries, and refrains from the use of explicit hard power tactics such as economic and militaristic threat. Chapter three, leaning on the findings of chapters one and two, outlined how dissuasion can be anticipated to be used in future American policy through the prediction of the creation of a new nuclear deal with Iran.

In order to adequately begin introducing dissuasion theory to the policy world, this conclusion recommends dissuasion begin being discussed in the institutional processes of Congress. Specifically, the premier place to begin is in congressional hearings in the United States Senate. The United States Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC) is the optimal committee to begin implementing adequately understood dissuasion into policy creation. There is a compelling institutional window of opportunity to start learning more about dissuasion through testimony of witnesses in hearings conducted by the SASC.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services conducts hearings all throughout the year, and calls leading officials from the defense world to testify on a wide array of topics. This research proposes that the Senate Committee on Armed Services specifically begin by holding a series of hearings on where deterrence has failed in American policy, what dissuasion is from the vantage point of key witnesses, and the results of current policy initiatives which closely align with the parameters of dissuasion outlined in this research. It is indeed feasible for the Senate Committee on Armed Services to conduct such hearings. And, should these respective hearings be conducted, the facilitation of production of useful testimony regarding dissuasion can be expected. Specifically, should Senators on the committee ask targeted questions regarding

dissuasion, the testimony which is derived from key witnesses can be used when crafting language for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

It is important to discuss why the National Defense Authorization Act is the primary reason this research finds that the Senate Committee on Armed Services should spearhead the push to begin incorporating dissuasion into policy creation. The NDAA is a massive \$731.6 billion piece of legislation which includes provisions for military pay raises, the construction of military housing and sweeping improvements to the federal government's approach to cybersecurity, among thousands of other provisions relating to American security¹⁵⁴. In fact, in January 2021, the Senate voted 81-13 to override President Donald Trump's veto of the fiscal 2021 defense authorization bill, marking a rebuke to the outgoing commander in chief that paved the way for the annual bill to become law for the 60th straight year.¹⁵⁵ Should the FY22 NDAA once again successfully pass in 2021, the streak of consecutive passage into law will stretch to 61 years. As the author of this research, and former staffer with the SASC, my first-hand experience has shown me that the NDAA being passed into law is a congressional phenomena. A bill of that size, consistently being passed into law, is unique in the contemporary American Congress. Partisanship often cripples the congressional initiatives in modern day, but the NDAA continues to enjoy safe passage.

Considering the legacy of the National Defense Authorization Act over the last 60 years, the ability to continuously pass this bill yields great influence and power to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Should a policy initiative be included in the final product of NDAA before departing the Senate, there is a 60-year precedent to expect that initiative will

¹⁵⁴ Jackson, Herb. "In Defiance of Trump, Senate Overrides Defense Veto." Roll Call. Roll Call, January 4, 2021. <https://www.rollcall.com/2021/01/01/in-defiance-of-trump-senate-overrides-defense-veto/>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

ultimately become law. As a testament to the reputation of the NDAA, there are often many miscellaneous policy initiatives which are attempted to be attached to the bill. As often happens with bills likely to be passed into law, the objective of miscellaneous attachments stem from hope that those respective attachments will be incorporated in the final product. If retained in NDAA, those attachments are almost guaranteed to become law.

The miscellaneous policy initiatives for which attempts are made to attach to the NDAA, particularly at the tail-end of the bill cycle, are often unrelated to SASC jurisdiction. Therefore, when unrelated policy initiatives are attached or attempted to be attached to the bill, the bill becomes an omnibus. According to Krutz, “omnibus legislating is a standard part of the congressional landscape altering traditional lawmaking in important ways, and omnibus bills are almost always enacted into law”.¹⁵⁶ Dissuasion, and dissuasion-oriented policy, in comparison to frivolous unrelated attachments to the bill (which often get dropped), are distinctly different. On the contrary, based on the findings of this research, dissuasion-related policy is not only a relative and pertinent concern when crafting language for defense policy, but is also pivotal to preserving American national security.

For example, chapter one of this thesis explained that the transition from the Quadrennial Defense Review to the National Defense Strategy as the cornerstone guidance for the Department of Defense yielded a “hole” in policy creation. The “hole” stemmed from undercutting dissuasion as tactic and tool which is used in policy creation. The realization of the “hole” in policy creation stemming from the transition from the QDR to the NDS is critical because the NDS is often leaned upon by Senators during questioning of witnesses amid hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Notably, former Chairman (now

¹⁵⁶ Krutz, Glen S. "Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): 210-23. Accessed March 26, 2021. doi:10.2307/2669368.

Ranking Member) Senator Jim Inhofe has a prevalent history of leaning on the NDS as a guiding document in his line of questioning amid hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. For example, as recently as March 2021, Senator Jim Inhofe asked Gen. McMaster, former National Security Advisor under President Trump, “what principles and priorities he feels should be retained from the 2018 National Defense Strategy”¹⁵⁷.

It is important to note that Committee staff are hired by and work for the Chairman and Ranking Members of the SASC. Considering that Senator Jim Inhofe often leans on the NDS as a guiding document for his line of questioning amid committee hearings, there is a notable path forward to spotlight the NDS, and how the NDS can be leaned on when questioning witnesses. It is recommended by this research that the Senators (ideally the Chairman and Ranking Member) of the SASC ask specific questions in a committee hearing relating to the NDS, how witnesses may believe dissuasion was undercut following the transition from the QDR, and how future initiatives may indeed be a tactic of dissuasion as opposed to deterrence or traditional diplomacy. Hearings may serve the function of being exploratory in nature to provide testimony and data about topics of current interest.¹⁵⁸ Relating to this research, the topic of interest is dissuasion in American policy.

Questions which are asked by Senators during hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services yield answers from prominent figures in the world of defense policy and national security. Naturally, answers derived from questions which have been asked during committee hearings are archived and utilized by committee staff. Committee staff take the testimony (answers) from witnesses in committee hearings, and use those respective answers to

¹⁵⁷ Cameron, Alex. “Sen. Inhofe Urges Policy Continuity In National Defense Strategy.” News On 6 - NewsOn6.com - Tulsa, OK - News, Weather, Video and Sports. News On 6, March 2, 2021.

¹⁵⁸ “Congressional Hearings.” govinfo.gov, March 17, 2021.

craft language for the NDAA during the markup and conference portions of the defense authorization bill cycle. The markup and conference portions of the NDAA bill cycle are the premier institutional window for dissuasion-related policy to begin to be incorporated into policy creation.

Regarding chapter two, the chapter fleshes how exactly dissuasion has been used by the United States historically. Additionally, the second chapter consists of unpacking the JCPOA, the Taiwan Relations Act, and bolstered nuclear ambiguity of Israel in relation to dissuasion which has been wielded by the United States. Each of the historical exemplars of American-utilized dissuasion in chapter two set a foundation for questioning which can be utilized by Senators amid hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Therefore, Senators can begin the process of incorporating dissuasion consideration into policy creation. Of course, this conclusion recommends that testimony which is derived from the baseline-originated questions be utilized in the crafting of language for the NDAA during the markup and conference portions of the defense authorization bill cycle.

Chapter two also provides a foundation for Senators to ask questions regarding dissuasion, diplomacy, and how the two are intertwined. For example, the second chapter explains that the TRA and JCPOA are diplomatic in nature. Additionally, the second chapter also highlights that the United States has leveraged a diplomatic relationship with Israel to wield dissuasion by bolstering Israeli nuclear ambiguity. The spotlight which is shed on the diplomatic attributes of dissuasion in chapter two provide another strong foundation from which Senators can derive questions for witnesses in a SASC hearing.

The foundation to derive questions for a congressional hearing is imperative. Particularly, a strong foundation is critical to begin the process of incorporating adequately understood

dissuasion into defense bill language through clear testimony from witnesses. The conclusion of this research suggests that Senators capitalize on the foundation of understanding the relationship between dissuasion and diplomacy. Senators ought to ask targeted questions aimed at determining if current policy initiatives are indeed tactics of dissuasion, and if those initiatives are diplomatic in nature.

Again, should Senators draw useful testimony which spotlights where dissuasion is indeed being used by the United States, this research recommends that language be derived from that testimony during markup and conference for the NDAA. Bottom line, if key witnesses produce information which confirms contemporary policy initiatives as being tactics of dissuasion due to diplomatic attributes, and those assertions are captured in congressional testimony, there is a clear opportunity for the SASC to begin writing dissuasion-oriented language which will be incorporated in the NDAA.

Chapter three, in similar fashion to chapters one and two, provides information to reinforce the significance of dissuasion in American policy. In fact, chapter three builds off of the findings of chapters one and two. The third chapter underscores the relevance of considering dissuasion for future American policy initiatives. Chapter three explains that the Biden Administration can be anticipated to pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran, and articulates why that is a pragmatic anticipation.

According to chapter three, the Biden Administration can be expected to pursue a new nuclear deal with Iran which parallels the JCPOA in dissuasive nature. Though this research anticipates a new deal to be pursued, there is also an expectation that key deficiencies of the 2015 JCPOA will be addressed. The final chapter of this research solidifies the assertion that the JCPOA was a tactic dissuasion, and explains how a paralleled new nuclear deal under the Biden

Administration is also expected to be a tactic of dissuasion. Ultimately, through the prediction of the JCPOA being used as a guidepost for a new nuclear deal with Iran, chapter three spotlights a very possible future use of dissuasion in American policy. Clearly, the chapter underscores that there is compelling reason to expect dissuasion to be used by the United States in the future by outlining a predictive example.

While this research successfully establishes dissuasion as a tactic in itself, and provides compelling rationale as to why dissuasion is significant to future American policy planning, there is still room for more research to be conducted. For example, based on the findings of this thesis, there is a need for more research in the area of potential future uses of dissuasion *by* the United States. Additionally, there is a need for more research in the area of potential future uses of dissuasion *against* the United States. This research outlines the likelihood of predicting a new dissuasive nuclear deal between Iran and the United States. As a result, that compelling prediction reinforces the fact that dissuasion will continue to be a part of American policy planning in the future. Further research should expound upon the realization that dissuasion will be a part of future American policy initiatives, and explore where dissuasion can be anticipated in new capacities and scenarios.

This conclusion suggests that further research which compellingly predicts the uses of dissuasion (by and against US) will contribute substantially to prudently creating dissuasion-related policy. The single in-depth predictive example of where dissuasion can be expected to be used in the future (offered in chapter three) is one example of many more possible scenarios. Should further research be conducted regarding where dissuasion can be anticipated in the future, a heightened sense of urgency to incorporate dissuasion consideration into policy will be garnered. A heightened sense of urgency to incorporate dissuasion theory into policy planning

due to its relation to future American security will result in legislation which reflects stronger policy.

This conclusion also suggests that there be further research regarding the congressional institutional process, what other committees can be leveraged as an institutional window to learn more about dissuasion, and how dissuasion theory can begin to be incorporated into policy creation. Therefore, this thesis recommends future research be conducted regarding the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC), and how dissuasion is intertwined with SFRC initiatives. As outlined in chapter two, dissuasion is diplomatic in nature. There is an opportunity to learn more about how dissuasion, diplomatically, contributes to the way in which the SFRC operates. Should new research be conducted regarding where dissuasion can be implemented through institutional windows of congress aside from the NDAA, there can be an expectation of a greater ability to include dissuasion into legislation. This research finds that searching for new institutional windows of Congress by analyzing the relationship between dissuasion and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is a natural “next step” to include dissuasion into policy. Ideally, just as this research has been conducted, analyzing the relationship between dissuasion and the SFRC ought to be done by an individual intimately familiar with the inner-workings of the committee.

All in all, the three substantive chapters comprising this thesis have reinforced the conclusion that dissuasion is indeed a tactic in itself. And, if policy creation by the United States in the future is to be comprehensively crafted, policymakers ought to not only understand dissuasion by its defining qualities and parameters, but also anticipate where dissuasion may be used in the future. This research as a whole explains that dissuasion is diplomatic in nature, and guides other nation states into acting out of their *own* volition. This research also highlights that

dissuasion utilizes targeted strategy and policy to complicate planning of another nation state, and can be used by *any* state regardless of deterrence capabilities. The three chapters comprising this thesis soundly establish those findings.

It is imperative for scholars and policy practitioners to make the distinction between deterrence and dissuasion because a greater understanding of the differences between the two concepts will yield stronger American policy and enhance American security. This research facilitates accomplishing the goal of understanding that deterrence relies on fear. This research finds that “the word ‘de-terrence’ in English consists of two parts that go back to (at least) ancient Latin. The ‘de’-prefix in ‘de’-terrence – similarly to so many other common verbs like deflect, depart, detach, derail, deviate, defend etc. – connotes ‘away from’.”¹⁵⁹ “The ‘-terrence’ part will for most people (accurately) trigger associations with the word ‘terror’, which derives from the Latin verb *terrere* ‘fill with fear, frighten’.”¹⁶⁰ Therefore, “those two components – 1) to use ‘fear’ to 2) push somebody ‘away from’ a course of action they may want to pursue – do indeed appear to be two foundational definitional building blocks that we find back in all disciplines in which deterrence is a focus of theoretical and/or practical inquiry”.¹⁶¹

This research finds that deterrence has undertaken a theoretical and practical capacity in American policy which stretches beyond the use of fear to accomplish a policy objective. This finding is problematic because “extending the definition of deterrence beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning obfuscates distinctions on which critical reasoning, effective

¹⁵⁹ David Yost, “Debating Security Strategies,” *Nato Review*, accessed October 6, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art4.htm>

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*

communication, and policy creation depend”.¹⁶² Therefore, this research rectifies that problem by reducing obfuscation and wrongful synonymous association. This research clearly finds that dissuasion must be considered as its own respective tactic; not simply another form of deterrence.

Dissuasion, according to this research, “refers not to *what* is to be achieved but to *how* – the means that are employed to get there”.¹⁶³ The means which constitute dissuasion as a tactic are guiding another state toward action out of its *own* volition,¹⁶⁴ utilizing strategy and actions to influence the nature of military competition, and channeling threats in certain directions to complicate planning for adversaries.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, this research finds dissuasion is differentiated from deterrence because dissuasion can be used by any nation state regardless of hard power capabilities, and is diplomatic in nature without necessarily being a traditional form of diplomacy.

This research provides an understanding of dissuasion at a greater depth by boiling down the understanding of deterrence to the mere act of threat-of-punishment through militaristic or economic terror. Therefore, when deterrence is simplified, dissuasion is able to adequately be considered by the comprising components laid out in the aforementioned

¹⁶² Paul Davis, “Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial: Using Simple Cognitive Models of the Adversary to Inform Strategy” (Rand Corporation, January 2014).

¹⁶³ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

¹⁶⁴ De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijjs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.

¹⁶⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.

paragraphs. Understanding that deterrence has been stretched beyond its threat-of-punishment meaning allows for dissuasion to fill the “hole” in policy planning, and close the gap in knowledge which was created in the transition from the QDR to the NDS. Filling the “hole” in policy planning will lead to more comprehensive policy creation through the proper consideration of dissuasion, and ultimately enhance American security.

Bibliography

- Anderson, R. Reed, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar, and John T. Vaughan. *STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE*. Report. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2016. 39-80. Accessed March 28, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12082.9.
- Albert, E. (n.d.). China-Taiwan Relations. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations>
- Arms control now. (n.d.). Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2017-08-29/understanding-us-compliance-certification-why-matters-iran-nuclear-deal>
- Aronson, Geoffrey. "Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question." *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 4 (1992): 617-30.
- Bahgat, Gawdat. "Iran and the United States: Reconcilable Differences?" *Iranian Studies* 41, no.2 (2008): 139-54. Accessed February 26, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25597446.
- Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjöström. "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation." *Journal of Political Economy* 116, no. 6 (2008): 1023-057.

- Brown, Kerry. "CHINA, IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES: Best Friends With Beijing." *TheWorld Today* 66, no. 3 (2010): 4-6. Accessed February 26, 2020
- BURROWS, MATHEW J. "History's Lessons for Resolving Today's Middle East Conflict" Report. Atlantic Council, 2016. Accessed February 26, 2020.
- Bush, Richard C., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Steven Pifer, and Kenneth M Pollack. "U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges." Brookings. Brookings, July 28, 2016. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-nuclear-and-extended-deterrence-considerations-and-challenges/>.
- Cameron, Alex. "Sen. Inhofe Urges Policy Continuity In National Defense Strategy." News On 6 - NewsOn6.com - Tulsa, OK - News, Weather, Video and Sports. News On 6, March 2, 2021.
- Cancian, Mark F., Rick McPeak, Melissa Dalton, John Schaus, Colin McElhinny, Andrew Metrick, Hijab Shah, William Arnest, Stephanie Hartley, Alexa Hopkins, and Aftan Snyder. *Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices*. Report. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. 10-24. Accessed June 3, 2020. doi:10.2307/resrep23188.7.
- Chan, Selina Ching. "Cultural Governance and Place-Making in Taiwan and China." *The China Quarterly*, no. 206 (2011): 372-90. Accessed March 28, 2020.
- China-Taiwan Relations. (n.d.). Retrieved December 14, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-taiwan-relations>
- Congressional Hearings. govinfo.gov, March 17, 2021.
- Crasnow, Sharon. "The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science: Evidence for Causal Claims." *Philosophy of Science* 79, no. 5 (2012): 655-66.
- David Yost, "Debating Security Strategies," *Nato Review*, accessed October 6, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art4.html>
- Davis, Lynn E., Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlivan, and Paul Steinberg. "Approaches to Influencing Iran." In *Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices*, 67-72. RAND Corporation, 2011. Accessed March 28, 2020.
- Davis, and Paul K. "Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial." RAND Corporation, January 15, 2014. https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1027.html.
- De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Khrystyna Holynska, Yar Batoh, and Tim Sweijs. Reimagining Deterrence: Towards Strategic (Dis)Suasion Design. Report. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020. 19-28.
- "Fact Sheets & Briefs." Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association. Accessed May 8, 2020. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.
- Gabriel Noronha | February 09. (2021, February 09). Any deal with Iran that excludes Congress is doomed to fail. Retrieved April 07, 2021, from <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/any-deal-with-iran-that-excludes-congress-is-doomed-to-fail>

- George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. "Deterrence and Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (1989): 170-82. Accessed April 7, 2020. doi:10.2307/2010406.
- GINSBERG, BENJAMIN, and KATHRYN WAGNER HILL. "Congress, the President, and Domestic Policy: Who Governs?" In *Congress: The First Branch, 183-212*. NEW HAVEN; LONDON: Yale University Press, 2019. Accessed March 8, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd856f.8>.
- Hatuel-Radoshitzky, Michal, and Eldad Shavit. Report. Institute for National Security Studies, 2020. Accessed March 10, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep27773.
- Hanhimäki, Jussi. "Self-Restraint as Containment: United States' Economic Policy, Finland, and the Soviet Union, 1945-1953." *The International History Review* 17, no. 2 (1995): 287-305. Accessed March 28, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40106978.
- Home: United States Committee on Armed Services. Armed Services Committees. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Charting Global Transitions. Report. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2015. 160-66.
- Jackson, Herb. "In Defiance of Trump, Senate Overrides Defense Veto." Roll Call. Roll Call, January 4, 2021. <https://www.rollcall.com/2021/01/01/in-defiance-of-trump-senate-overrides-defense-veto/>.
- Kim, Suk Hi, and Mario Martin-Hermosillo. "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against Nuclear North Korea." *North Korean Review* 9, no. 2 (2013): 99-110. Accessed May 8, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/43908923.
- Kirchofer, Charles P. "Managing Non-State Threats with Cumulative Deterrence-by-Denial." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11, no. 2 (2017): 21-35. Accessed March 28, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26297776.
- Kugler, Richard L., and National Defense University Washington DC Inst for National Strategic Studies. "Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept". DTIC
- Krepinevich, Andrew F, and Robert Martinage. "Dissuasion Strategy." CSBA. Accessed May 8, 2021. <https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/dissuasion-strategy/publication/1>.
- Kristensen, Hans M., Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. Report. Federation of American Scientists, 2009. 14-20. Accessed April 7, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18937.11.
- Krutz, Glen S. "Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001): 210-23. Accessed March 26, 2021. doi:10.2307/2669368.
- Lee, Seung Hyun. "U.S.-North Korean Relations: Classifications Based on Policy Decisions and Their Effect on the Korean Peninsula." *North Korean Review* 6, no. 1 (2010): 88-99. Accessed March 28, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/43898187.
- Major, Claudia, and Christian Mölling. "Rethinking Deterrence: Adapting an Old Concept to New Challenges" Report. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2016. Accessed February 26, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18842.
- McInnis, J. Matthew, Jon B. Alterman, Michael Connell, Michael Eisenstadt, Farideh Farhi, Thomas Karako, Hijab Shah, Michael Sulmeyer, and Ian Williams. *Deterring Iran after the Nuclear Deal*. Report. Edited by Hicks Kathleen H. and Dalton Melissa G. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017. 25-33. Accessed June 14, 2020. doi:10.2307/resrep23152.8.

- Mozaffarian, Dariush, Jordan A Blashek, and James Stavridis. "Learning from Soft Power." *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 351 (2015). Accessed February 26, 2020.
- Mueller, Karl P. "Conventional Deterrence Redux: Avoiding Great Power Conflict in the 21st Century." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2018): 76-93.
- Muller, Lilly Pijnenburg, and Tim Stevens. Report. Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), 2017. Accessed March 28, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08037.
- National Defense Strategy of the United States
- Narang, Vipin. "Israel." In *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*, 179-206. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Naveh, Yair. Report. "Deterrence against Non-State Actors: Thoughts following Operation Protective Edge" Institute for National Security Studies, 2015. Accessed February 26, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08296.
- Nevill, Liam, and Zoe Hawkins. *Deterrence in Cyberspace: Different Domain, Different Rules*. Report. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 6. Accessed March 28, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04232.5.
- Nye, Joseph S. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-71.
- Nye, Joseph S. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 94-109.
- Paul Davis, "Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial: Using Simple Cognitive Models of the Adversary to Inform Strategy" (Rand Corporation, January 2014).
- President of the United States. *The national security strategy of the United States of America*. 2017.
- QUACKENBUSH, STEPHEN L. "Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?" *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 741-62. Accessed February 26, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/23024618.
- Quackenbush, Stephen L. "National Missile Defense and Deterrence." *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (2006): 533-41. Accessed March 28, 2020.
- Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2001.
- Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2009
- Ramazani, Rouhollah K. "Iran and the United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship." *Middle East Journal* 30, no. 3 (1976): 322-34. Accessed February 26, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/4325515.
- Rathbun, Brian C. "The Value and Values of Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy's Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East*, 1-21. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2014.
- Reut Institute. "Soft Power" Report. Reut Institute, 2007. Accessed February 26, 2020.
- Scott, JKL. "Dissuasion, Disinformation, Dissonance: Complexity and Autocritique as Tools of Information Warfare." *Journal of Information Warfare* 14, no. 4 (2015): 25-42. Accessed March 28, 2020.
- Staff, Washington Post. Full Text: Obama's News Conference on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The Washington Post. WP Company, May 1, 2019.

Third Way. Report. Third Way, 2020.

“United States Committee on Armed Services.” Hearing | Hearings | United States Committee on Armed Services

Viaud, Astrid. Report. Egmont Institute, 2016. Accessed February 17, 2021.

Wirtz, James J. "How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2018): 58-75. Accessed March 28, 2020.

Wright, Thomas. How Donald Trump Thinks about Iran. Brookings. Brookings, January 7, 2020